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Preface 
The first memories I have of the Lake Charles area are from early childhood. My father was born 
and raised in the area, and we would sometimes visit extended family there. Driving west along 
Interstate 10, we would pass through Lake Charles, cross the Calcasieu River, and continue west 
a few miles to Sulphur, where the family lived. At first glance, Lake Charles is not a very 
remarkable city; its appearance is not much different from any other small urban area. There are 
schools, slums, ranch houses, malls, a small university, and an airport. The city sits on a nearly 
circular lake, with man-made beaches and riverboat casinos lining the shores. However, what we 
saw on the west side of the lake always made me think twice about taking a swim. In Westlake 
(the community just across the river), the highway seems to run an industrial gauntlet. As we 
drove, towers, pipes, tanks, and flames surrounded us. The names came into view on tanks, 
trucks, rail cars, and road signs: PPG, Conoco, Citgo. The sign welcoming you to Westlake 
hangs from industrial pipes, suggesting the intimate bond this area has with industry. 
 
Entrance to Westlake 
(Photo Credit: Author) 
 Baseball fields lay in the shadow of tank farms. Streets have names such as Cities Service 
Highway and PPG Road. Windsocks hang from poles around the city, offering crucial safety 
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information in case of an accidental release. Industry affects nearly every aspect of life in this 
region, and even at a young age, I could see that this was a unique place. It was much different 
from the town in central Louisiana where I grew up. The largest industry I had seen at home was 
a paper mill. While all of these sights and smells in Lake Charles were offensive at the time, I 
later learned that the plants were the reason my father's family came to Lake Charles. My 
grandfather was the chief safety officer at the Cities Service refinery, and many of his relatives 
had moved to Lake Charles (from northwestern Louisiana) for the job opportunities in the 
petroleum industry. The contradiction of the positive (jobs) and negative (pollution) aspects of 
industrial agglomerations was my inspiration for this research. I wanted to explore the social, 
cultural, and geographic forces behind the industrial growth of the area, and how people reacted 
to this sudden, drastic change.  
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Abstract 
 This paper focuses on the industrialization of Lake Charles, Louisiana during World War 
Two and the resulting shifts in pollution-related policy and public perceptions of pollution.  A 
major impetus for the industrialization of the South was federal investment during the war. This 
is especially true for Lake Charles, a city where industrial agglomeration began with war-time 
financing of manufacturing plants to combat the shortages of aviation fuel and rubber. By tracing 
the public response to offensive pollution and the resulting shift in public policy, this paper will 
reveal a fundamental conflict between development-minded government institutions and a 
population interested in protecting natural resources. The responses to pollution in this newly 
industrializing Southern city expose an underlying popular dissatisfaction with the pollution-
tolerant policy.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Geography and History 
 Lake Charles is a city situated in southwestern Louisiana, at the convergence of the west 
Louisiana forests, south-central Louisiana prairies, and Gulf Coast marshland. According to the 
2000 census, the city had a population of 71,757 persons, with an Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) population of 184,700. Interstate 10 runs east-west through Lake Charles, and when 
traveling this highway, the most striking characteristic of the city is its particularly industrial 
nature. Refineries and petrochemical plants line both sides of the highway, and dot the horizon in 
many directions. When lit up at night, they almost overpower the lights of the city. This 
industrial agglomeration is what most often receives the credit for the city’s growth to its present 
size. Before the twentieth century, however, it would have been hard to imagine the substantial 
industrialization and growth Lake Charles would experience. 
 The first European settlers arrived in the Lake Charles area during the Revolutionary 
War. Residents later named the lake after Charles Sallier, a native of Savoy, France, who built 
his home on the shores in 1800. The lake itself is nearly circular and two miles wide, with the 
Calcasieu River running through its western side. By 1867, enough settlers (150) had arrived on 
the banks of the lake to incorporate a town named, appropriately, Lake Charles. The townspeople 
initially made most of their money in the cattle industry, utilizing the vast pastures to the east and 
south of the city. In 1880, however, both the railroad and the timber industry arrived. The 
Louisiana Western Railroad connected the city to many parts of the state, east and west, and 
spurred an interest in development in the area. J.B. Watkins of the North American Land & 
Timber Company bought 960,000 acres of the large forested area north of the city, and built a 
railroad running north and south to serve this natural resource area. This railroad would soon 
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connect the city with St. Louis and thus many northern markets. It also heralded the beginning of 
extensive railroad building and logging in western and southwestern Louisiana. In 1892, longleaf 
pine covered 2,500,000 acres in this area of Louisiana, and logging companies from the North 
poured in for the harvest. The explosion of the timber industry was so extensive that loggers 
virtually exhausted the forests by the early 1930s (Stokes 1957). J.B. Watkins also helped 
develop the rice industry, which would become a large contributor to the southwestern Louisiana 
economy. In 1886, he invited Dr. Seaman A. Knapp, one of the leading agriculturalists of the 
Midwest, to Lake Charles. Knapp worked with rice farmers to improve irrigation and production, 
and constructed the first rice mill in the city, with a capacity of 3,000 barrels per day. Watkins’ 
timber company even constructed a canal that would provide for the irrigation of 15,000 acres of 
rice fields. Because of these developments, by the early 1890s Lake Charles was the center of the 
rice industry in Louisiana, and southwestern Louisiana had claimed its position as the leading 
rice production area in the United States. The next industry to come to the city was sulphur 
mining. The Union Sulphur Company began extracting sulphur in 1896 from what would 
become the world’s largest sulphur mine nine miles west of Lake Charles in Sulphur, Louisiana. 
With all of these developments, Lake Charles was a growing city at the turn of the century, but 
very slowly. Most of the labor and capital was still concentrated in agricultural sectors. The 
population was only 6,680 and growing slowly, with only 850 people employed in industry (U.S. 
Census Bureau 1960; Lane 1959; Ferguson 1931).  
Lake Charles Attractions 
This all changed with the discovery of oil fields in East Texas. In January 1901, the 
discovery of oil on Spindletop near Beaumont, Texas, began the oil rush in the Gulf Coast area. 
Spindletop was a colossal find, as it yielded 80,000 barrels of oil per day, compared to the usual 
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“big” producers of the day (50 barrels per day). Lake Charles was in a perfect geographical 
location to exploit this new industry, adding to the city’s traditional exports of rice and timber. 
Oil and natural gas resources along the Gulf Coast are located primarily near geologic structures 
known as salt domes. These are uplifted columns of salt left over from the Jurassic-era 
evaporation of a shallow Gulf of Mexico. The salt is uplifted in columns by the weight of the 
sediment layers above it. As it rises, it bends the sediment layers upward, and the oil within the 
layers flows towards the salt column. The impermeable salt layer then traps the oil. Spindletop is 
the name of a hill that forms the top of a salt dome uplift, and salt domes are common near the 
coasts of both Louisiana and Texas. Geologists and wildcatters soon realized that drilling around 
salt domes was the best bet for oil, and they set to the task all along the Texas and Louisiana 
Gulf Coast.  
 Thus, by the early twentieth century, Lake Charles had three major economic operations: 
oil, timber, and rice. The city was located on major road (U.S. Highway 90) and rail lines that 
passed from Houston through to New Orleans, offering a trade connection for all of these 
resources with the two biggest cities of the Gulf Coast region. However, Lake Charles, unlike 
Houston and New Orleans, did not have a deep-water port. The city had its own natural 
waterway, the Calcasieu River, which was not suitable for heavy navigation. During the 1920s, 
the residents began to protest the fact that, while farmers grew most of the Louisiana rice within 
sixty miles of the city, they had to ship it out of ports in Beaumont and New Orleans (Lane 
1959). Also at this time, the lumber industry was quickly depleting the virgin timber stands 
around the city, highlighting the need for industrial diversification. A deep-water port would 
bring regional, national, and international trade opportunities that Lake Charles desperately 
needed.  
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 City leaders appealed to the federal government for funding, but the authorities refused. 
The city then decided to issue bonds and raise the money for the port and deep-water channel 
themselves. Lake Charles was the first city in the country to accomplish this feat, and the Port of 
Lake Charles (known officially as the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District) opened on 
November 30, 1926, to much fanfare and celebration. It incorporated 95 square miles along both 
sides of the Calcasieu River, with 48 miles of frontage on deep water and 18 miles on shallow 
water (Lane 1959, Little 1965). The new deep-water channel in the Calcasieu River provided two 
outlets to the Gulf of Mexico. The first went south to the Intracoastal Canal, then west to the 
Sabine River and south to the sea via Port Arthur, Texas. The other route, which reduced the 
distance to sea from 75 miles to 33 miles, went straight down the Calcasieu River and the new 
Calcasieu Ship Channel crossing Calcasieu Lake to the Gulf (Figure 1). The stage was now set 
for the industrial expansion of Lake Charles. The oil trade was booming, and both petroleum and 
the more traditional industries of the area now had a direct outlet to the rest of the world through 
the Port of Lake Charles. The Port would end up being “one of the principal factors in the 
development of the industrial section of the trade area” (Lane 1959: 31). 
 The port was not the only factor to attract industry to Lake Charles. City leaders extolled 
the proximity to the oil fields, and the extensive transportation network that connected the city to 
the rest of the world. This included Highway 90, which ran east and west along the coast and 
connected to northern routes, and the Intracoastal Canal (easily accessible thanks to the new 
port) which offered quick access to the entire Mississippi River system without threat of U-boat 
attack (Lane 1959). Two major rail lines also connected the Lake Charles area to the rest of the 
country: Watkins’ line to the north connecting to Kansas City and St. Louis, and an east-west 
line connecting to New Orleans (and the Mississippi River) and all of Texas. The city also could 
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be (and eventually was) connected by a direct pipeline to Sour Lake, Texas. Sour Lake was a 
major pipeline hub through which Lake Charles could receive crude oil through a myriad of 
pipeline systems stretching across the country.  
 
 
Figure 1. Calcasieu Ship Channel  
      (Source: Lake Charles Association of Commerce 1948) 
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For finished products, the city eventually would have a direct connection to the War Emergency 
pipeline near Beaumont, Texas, which would allow express shipment to the east coast (Foster 
1944). The enticements of cheap natural resources and low-cost transport to the Midwest and 
Northeast would eventually make the Gulf Coast a major center of the petroleum and 
petrochemical industry (Little 1965). Lake Charles would be a major part of this industrial 
region, and one well worth studying. 
Why Lake Charles? 
 Despite the distinctive industrial qualities of the Lake Charles region, the academic 
literature on it is rather thin. Three master’s theses from Louisiana State University focus on the 
growth of the city. These are history writings, however, and are limited to a dry listing of facts. 
The first, from 1931, demonstrates the history of the growth of the city from its founding through 
the 1920s. The second, from 1959, contains the industrial development of the city, but focuses 
solely on the economic impacts of this growth. The third, a 1967 thesis, concentrates on the 
political development of the city. These works were useful in gaining a general sense of the 
history and industrial growth of the city, but did not offer much in terms of exploring the social 
impacts of this growth. Furthermore, they did not delve into the topic of the water pollution 
produced by the new industry (Cagle 1967; Lane 1959; Ferguson 1931). The geography and 
environmental history literature on the area suffers from a geographic bias: most academic 
writings on the Gulf Coast petroleum and petrochemical corridor stop at the Louisiana border, 
focusing primarily on the Upper Texas Gulf Coast (Colten 2001; Pratt 1978). This region is the 
heart of Gulf Coast petroleum and petrochemical growth, and deserves attention and study. In 
addition, the industrial zone between Baton Rouge and New Orleans (“Cancer Alley”) has 
garnered much attention. As one of the few industrial agglomerations with a major city 
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downstream, the area is a common subject of pollution research (Allen 2003; Colten 2000). 
However, Lake Charles is stuck in between these two more notable industrial agglomerations, 
and is nearly absent from the literature, save a few one- or two-page treatments (Cowdrey 1983: 
113; Markowitz & Rosner 2002: 230). A wonderful example of this geographic gap is Joel 
Goldsteen’s (1993) book Danger All Around: Waste Storage on the Taxes and Louisiana Gulf 
Coast. In his review of the impacts of industrial waste landscapes on surrounding communities, 
he uses both the upper Texas Gulf Coast area and the two parishes surrounding Baton Rouge as 
case studies. Lake Charles, an important industrial landscape in between these two 
agglomerations, receives hardly a mention.  
 The Lake Charles area deserves study beyond simple historical facts and reviews of the 
economic benefits of industrialization. It deserves a thorough review of the geographic, social, 
and economic factors behind local industrialization, along with how this process fit into the 
greater industrialization of the South. It also deserves a study of the negative consequences of 
industrialization, and how both local and state governments, along with the citizenry, reacted to 
these consequences.  
 Consequently, the first aim of this thesis is to trace the development of an industrial 
landscape in Lake Charles. Lake Charles and Calcasieu Parish had a rural, agricultural landscape 
prior to industrialization. Industrialization brought considerable change, converting the area into 
an urban industrial landscape. The transformation came very quickly, as companies hastily built 
plants to produce war materials for the Second World War. This was a common theme in most of 
the South, and I will compare and contrast Lake Charles to the general Southern industrialization 
experience (Scranton 2001; Dewey 1999; Cobb 1993; Cobb 1984). Second, I will examine 
whether the primacy of wartime production goals was enough to suppress pollution concerns for 
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the duration of the war. Trade literature of the day suggests that industry was willing to set aside 
pollution concerns for production goals (“Industrial Waste…” 1945: 117; Mohlman 1945: 20). 
This research will question whether the citizens of Lake Charles were also willing to do this. 
Next, this paper will investigate the role of local and state government institutions in the 
industrialization of the city and pollution abatement efforts. Was government’s focus on 
promoting industrial growth or protecting the citizenry from harmful pollution?  
 In general, I will investigate reactions from both government and citizen to the 
developing pollution threat. Industry in the city was a major source of water pollution, and the 
rapid social and economic shifts caused conflicts between the established population who relied 
on (now-threatened) local natural resources and the new industrialists, workers, and the 
governments who courted them. Additionally, I will examine the focus of pollution related issues 
in Lake Charles. Much of the literature on industrial and urban pollution focuses on effects on 
public health (Melosi 2000; Tarr 1996; Pratt 1980; Tarr 1985). In fact, Melosi (2000) argues that 
Northern states implemented public health policy in reaction to pollution threats much earlier 
and much more quickly than in the South. Colten (2006), while studying a rural are in 
northeastern Louisiana, offers a possible explanation by highlighting the particularly Southern 
focus on local natural resource protection. This research will first examine whether urban 
citizens in Lake Charles were just as likely to take action against new pollution problems as rural 
Louisiana citizens were. Second, this research will investigate whether pollution problems were 
addressed as natural resource issues in the urban Lake Charles area, or if the larger population 
necessitated a concentration on public health.  
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Sources 
 As source materials, I used not only the corpus of historical geography and environmental 
history literature, but also many primary, archival materials. Of these materials, there were four 
main sources: the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, the Louisiana Department of Fish and Wild Life, 
the Calcasieu Parish Court, and the Louisiana Stream Control Commission. I also used the 
Census Bureau’s Country Business Reports and Census of Manufactures to trace the growth of 
the city’s industry. I examined these historical records and reports for the years between 1940 
and 1960, when the industrialization of Lake Charles was in full swing. I restricted my research 
to this period because I wanted to examine reactions to pollution before the environmental 
movement of the 1970s brought these issues into the national consciousness.  
 The Calcasieu Parish Police Jury (hereafter CPPJ) is the governing body for the entire 
parish, so they deal with all land transactions, infrastructure, and citizen complaints for any 
unincorporated area of the parish. The Police Jury houses the minutes of all their meetings in an 
archival vault. Police Jury clerks noted keywords of subjects and topics for each meeting, and 
organized these keywords into index in the beginning of each book. I scanned this index for 
relevant keywords such as the names of industrial corporations or “pollution” or “Calcasieu 
River.” This resulted in a wealth of information, which helped me to trace the construction of an 
industrial landscape in the city.  
 The Department of Fish and Wild Life (hereafter DWF) played a major role in this 
research because they were, like in many southern states, the agency primarily responsible for 
water pollution control. Most of the DWF information came from the Department’s biennial 
reports, which served as a summary of the Department’s activities. However, they most likely 
also served as a method of proving worthiness for continued funding to the Louisiana legislature. 
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I used these with caution, but was encouraged to see that at certain points, the DWF was not 
afraid to castigate the legislature for lackluster pollution abatement legislation.  
 The Calcasieu Parish Court lies at an important intersection of citizen and state. Lacking 
any comprehensive state pollution law, citizens’ only legal course of action was a nuisance 
lawsuit, filed in Parish Court. Consequently, I searched the case records of the parish court for 
the twenty years of my focus. The vast majority of cases involved worker’s compensation 
claims, but I was able to find a few pollution-related suits. However, case records sometimes do 
not offer much information on the motivations or reasoning behind occurrences in the case. 
Some cases against industry ended with no more explanation than that the plaintiff dropped all 
charges.  
 The Louisiana Stream Control Commission (hereafter SCC), created by the state 
legislature in 1940, consisted of representatives from DWF, the attorney general’s office, and the 
state public health service. Its duty was to regulate water pollution in the state that could harm 
fish or public health, so they began direct dealings with industry as soon as agglomerations 
began to form. For this research, I used the minutes of SCC meetings and correspondence 
between SCC members, industry, and citizens. The SCC no longer exists, but the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality now houses all of this information. Fortunately, The 
LDEQ scanned all of the available SCC documents into a computer database that is easy to 
search. Unfortunately, not all of the information survived long enough to be entered. The 
meeting minutes are somewhat sparse in the 1940s, and the earliest meetings simply offer a brief 
description of what occurred instead of a full transcript. The correspondence is also lacking. The 
majority of surviving SCC correspondence relates to the Mathieson Alkali Works. There are only 
three or four letters pertaining to the Cities Service Corporation, who operated what was by far 
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the largest refinery in the area. Nothing at all is available for Continental Oil Company, and 
many other Lake Charles industrial companies. Fortunately, the Mathieson material offered a 
glimpse into early, wartime reactions of both citizens and government to growing industrial 
pollution. In addition, Colten (2005; 2000) has written about the reactions of the SCC to 
pollution in other portions of the state, so I was able to compare and contrast this with the SCC’s 
action in Lake Charles. 
 The Census data was somewhat more difficult to work with, as anyone who has worked 
with Census data knows. Making sense of the data to trace Louisiana’s industrial (and 
petroleum/petrochemical industry) growth was an uphill battle. Through the 1940s, two separate 
data sets were available: the Census of Manufactures and the County Business Patterns. Only 
towards the very end of the decade did the two agencies responsible for this data attempt to 
coordinate their efforts. In addition, the Census Bureau is constantly adding new categories and 
removing or merging old ones. For instance, in 1949, the County Business Patterns created a 
separate category to list industrial workers who were involved in administrative and auxiliary 
units instead of the actual manufacturing processes. The addition of workers to this new category 
and removal from old categories gives the false impression that employment dropped during this 
period in many categories. Despite this, the transformation of Lake Charles into an industrial city 
was significant and rapid enough to be plainly obvious in the Census data. 
Organization 
 Several extensive background chapters will precede the local case study.  These build the 
essential foundation for the more detailed examination of Lake Charles and help situate it as an 
example of Southern, petrochemical industrial development that had to deal with the 
environmental consequences of its operation.  Chapter 2 will provide a review of the growth of 
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American industry in the early twentieth century. This expansion of scale will offer a preview of 
the economic, social, and geographic forces that led to in the industrialization of Lake Charles 
during the middle of the century. A discussion of industrial location theory and the factors that 
drive expanding companies to locate in certain places begins the chapter. The last half of the 
chapter focuses on the growth of the petroleum industry throughout the United States, and the 
factors that accelerated this growth. Chapter 3 will begin to shrink the scale of research, by 
focusing on industrial growth in the South. Local, state, and federal government incentives led to 
the industrialization of this historically agricultural region. These incentives, their effects, and 
the differences between traditional industrial areas of the country and the South will be a major 
concentration of this chapter. This discussion will help illuminate the attractive qualities the 
South (and Lake Charles) held for incoming industry. The chapter will also begin the discussion 
of the negative effects of industrialization, namely pollution. Chapter 4 will focus on this waste, 
especially that caused by the petroleum industry. The discussion will also include waste 
treatment methods prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century. I will then compare this 
information with data on waste streams and waste treatment methods in Lake Charles during 
industrialization. Chapter 5 will feature an introduction to the reactions of citizens and 
government to new pollution threats. This will act as a base from which to study the reactions of 
the Lake Charles government and populace to the pollution caused by industrialization. Chapter 
6 will discuss the industrialization of the Lake Charles area, and Chapter 7 will examine the 
reactions of local and state government, as well as the citizenry of Lake Charles, to the industrial 
pollution. 
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Chapter 2 
Industrial Expansion in the Early Twentieth Century 
 
 The early twentieth century witnessed a new sort of industrial expansion in America. The 
fledgling petroleum industry was booming, and breaking all the rules of traditional American 
manufacturing and industry. Since the birth of the country, industrial efforts had been 
concentrated in the Northeast. At the beginning of the 19th century, industrialists from England 
settled in the Northeast and used their knowledge to spark the American industrial revolution. 
With the expansion of railroads, the traditional manufacturing belt expanded to include the 
Northeast’s culturally similar border areas in the Midwest as well (Peet 1997). This area had 
ready access to nearby coal and other minerals, along with easy transportation on rail and the 
Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. At the turn of the twentieth century, however, traditional textile and 
steel manufacturing of the Northeast/Midwest had new competition from the petroleum industry. 
Oil companies first extracted crude in Pennsylvania, which quickly became important to urban 
areas in the Northeast and coal-poor areas such as the West and Southwest. Soon demand would 
arise from all parts of the country (Pratt 1980). The burgeoning petroleum industry would fuel 
the growth of the classic Fordist economy in the United States. Fordism consisted of the 
principles of mass production and consumption, and the petroleum industry both became a 
vehicle of mass production as well as a source of energy for the rest of the Fordist economy. 
Technical changes within this industry and others would increase labor productivity and wages, 
which would then fuel a growth of consumer mass markets (Tickell & Peck 1992). These 
markets would consume not only petroleum products, but also products that were manufactured 
using petroleum products. 
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While Fordism originated in the Northeast and Midwest, it quickly spread throughout the 
country (Peet 1997). The petroleum industry echoed this pattern of decentralization. Though 
oilmen drilled the first wells in the Northeast and Midwest, the discovery of Spindletop in 
eastern Texas would shift the focus of the petroleum industry to the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. 
Oil companies began flocking to the gulf coast, and shipping their oil by barge to the Northeast, 
their new largest market. After World War I, there was a rapid expansion in refining, with U.S. 
refining capacity increasing threefold between 1918 and 1929. Most of this growth occurred on 
the Gulf Coast and ended years of industrial dominance by the Northeast and Midwest. The 
petroleum industry led the way in what would prove to be the decentralization of industry in the 
United States. 
Industrial Location  
 When oilmen discovered the gulf coast oil fields, it seemed an easy choice for companies 
to move both production and refining facilities to the South. However, choosing a location for a 
new industrial site is not as simple as measuring distance to a resource material. Many 
calculations and smaller decisions are required before choosing a site, and a new branch of study 
named location theory focused on this problem. Alfred Weber developed the first models and 
theories, known as classical location theory. These were simplistic and focused mainly on 
minimizing transport costs. The key decision was where to locate the plant as one part of the 
“location triangle,” which included the source, industry, and market. These theories also assumed 
an isotropic plain of uniform land costs and transport costs across the country. Soon, economists 
were developing complex models that incorporated multiple products and location rent 
fluctuations (Stevens & Brackett 1967). To today's audience, these models may seem single-
minded; they focused solely on production costs, transport costs, and markets. The discussion of 
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industrial location most certainly had changed since the early twentieth century. Modern 
geographers and economists discuss industrial growth and expansion not only as a product of 
industrial decisions and economic trends, but also in relation to more complex variables such as 
culture (Peet 1997). However, during the period this paper covers, Weber's location theory was 
the basis of nearly all industrial location discussions. For this reason, we will focus on Weber 
and his immediate successors. 
 Weber's theories focused mostly on the costs faced by industry. Weber stated that the 
three components of cost were input, processing, and delivery. Input included the costs of the 
raw materials plus transport from the source, and delivery consisted of the cost of transport to 
market. Processing costs included the factory itself, machinery and upkeep, wages, electricity 
and gas, and taxes. Firms needed to find ways to keep all three of these costs low. Two effective 
strategies for realizing this goal were to create economies of scale and/or economies of 
agglomeration, both of which would figure prominently in industrial decentralization and the rise 
of the petroleum industry.  
An economy of scale entails a lowering of production costs through an enlargement of 
operations. Weber (1984) wrote that there are three reasons larger productions facilities are more 
efficient. First, the division of labor is greater with a larger work force. Workers only have to 
learn one task, do not waste time switching tasks, and have lower salaries because of their lower 
skill level. Companies can mechanize simpler tasks more easily, precluding the need for workers 
in the first place. Secondly, larger companies can use larger and more plentiful machines, thus 
increasing production output. Finally, economies of scale require proportionally fewer reserves 
(spare materials and parts) than smaller operations, because for a given risk, the level of required 
reserves rises more slowly than the level of output (Weber 1984). Economies of scale were very 
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important to the industrial growth of the gulf coast. Most of the refineries and plants built there 
were the largest of their day, such as the Cities Service refinery in Lake Charles. By 1950, six of 
the twelve largest U.S. refineries were located on the Gulf Coast. 
While economies of scale offer lower processing costs, economies of agglomeration offer 
lower transport costs. Economies of agglomeration arise when factories locate in a cluster, or at 
least fairly near to each other. If the firms sell intermediate products to each other, they save on 
transport costs because of the short distances. In addition, because of the higher demand for 
transportation services in such a small area, these services are better developed and of lower cost 
due to high competition. They also develop an economy of information because of more rapid, 
easier communications. This allows them to share information that will allow the agglomeration 
to run more smoothly as one unit (Weber 1984). Economies of agglomeration grew quickly 
along the gulf coast. By 1950, the gulf coast claimed 34 percent of the refining capacity of the 
United States. All of this refining power clustered in four major agglomerations: Houston-Texas 
City, Beaumont-Port Arthur, Baton Rouge, and Lake Charles (Parsons 1950). 
 Economies of scale and agglomeration would both factor heavily in decentralization and 
the new industrial landscape of the gulf south, but one of the most important factors in gulf coast 
industrial growth was the abundance of raw materials. According to Weber, a major location 
decision facing industry was whether to locate closer to the raw materials or to the market. In 
their much-cited book Why Industry Moves South, Glenn McLaughlin and Stefan Robock apply 
Weber’s question of materials vs. market to Southern industrialization. For the petroleum 
industry, they argue that, in theory, there was little to attract companies to resource-rich areas far 
from the market. There was little weight lost between crude oil and finished products, so a 
location near crude reserves would not significantly reduce transportation costs (McLaughlin & 
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Robock 1949). In fact, nationwide, refineries tended to locate near markets because demand was 
far more stable than supplies at any given oil field. This tendency, however, did not occur on the 
gulf coast (Parsons 1950). In Louisiana, the wealth of raw materials was the primary attractive 
feature to the petroleum industry (McMichael 1961). Material-oriented gulf coast plants were, in 
fact, able to save on transport costs because of their location. A material-oriented location 
allowed industry to avoid backtracking when delivering multiple products to multiple markets, as 
the petroleum and petrochemical industry does. If the plant was located near one market and 
needed to ship a product to another market near the raw materials source, this backtracking 
would double their transport costs. Secondly, the easy access to water transport enjoyed by Gulf 
Coast industry made for more economical product shipment (McLaughlin & Robock 1949).
 In reality, industrial location decisions are more complex than proximity to markets or 
raw materials. Other important factors include differences in land prices between the heavily 
urbanized Northeast/Midwest and the rural South. The South had more (and cheaper) land 
available in desirable areas, such as river basins where industry would have easy access to an 
abundance of water for processing and cooling. In fact, most Southern industry would locate far 
from the city center, on large tracts of land bought by industrial corporations. Consequently, the 
southern industrial landscape looked quite different from the congested factory districts of the 
Northeast and Midwest (Parsons 1950).  
 Yet another factor that allowed industrial relocation in the South was a fall in 
transportation costs, initiated by the introduction of more efficient infrastructure (Weber 1984). 
The rail companies faced new competition from trucks as the nation’s highway system spread to 
southern states, and larger, improved ships and barges were able to service the gulf coast area 
thanks to the Intracoastal Waterway. In McMichaels’ study, the industries surveyed listed both 
  17
sources of water and transportation infrastructure very high on the list of Louisiana’s attractive 
features. In fact, McLaughlin and Robock report that the Cities Service Corporation selected 
Lake Charles as a location because of its excellent transportation infrastructure and ample supply 
of fresh water (McLaughlin & Robock 1949). In fact, water transportation would become a 
crucial factor in the industrialization of the entire gulf coast. By 1950, eight gulf coast ports 
(including Lake Charles) placed among the top fourteen American deep-water ports in terms of 
tonnage (Parsons 1950).  
Large refineries such as those along the gulf coast required labor, and the availability, 
attitude, and wage demands of industrial labor were all factors that companies considered in a 
location decision. Generally, the South’s labor force had many characteristics that industry found 
desirable. There was a labor surplus due to the mechanization of agriculture, and there was a 
significant wage gap between southern and northern states. In addition, the vast majority of 
southern labor was non-union. Organized labor had made some gains in the South prior to World 
War II, but after the war company managers worked to nullify these advances. Unions then made 
repeated efforts throughout the next few decades to organize southern labor, but all of these 
campaigns ultimately failed. Historians have placed the blame for this on company executives 
and southern state governments, which were extremely effective at resisting organization. State 
governments departed from the national norm, and maintained laws that prohibited bargaining 
among public employees. Southern industry was more than willing to harass (sometimes through 
violence) or fire union supporters, and close plants that supported unionization. This resistance 
continued even into the 1980s (Minchin 2005).  
 Even factors as seemingly insignificant as climate were critical to industrial location 
decision. The South had much milder winters than the Northeast and Midwest. How this factored 
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into location decisions had much less to do with the comfort of employees than with economic 
concerns. The mild winters of the South meant that companies did not need to weatherproof vast 
amounts of buildings, pipelines, and equipment or insulate them against freezing temperatures. 
This resulted in a significant savings during the construction of plants and infrastructure. 
 All of these types of factors, as well as the larger size of modern corporations, allowed 
decentralization and the growth of Southern industry to occur. These desirable aspects are known 
as specification factors- characteristics that make one industrial location advantageous to another 
one. Industrialists only consider these factors subsequent to capability factors – characteristics 
that make an industrial location possible (Storper, Walker, & Widess 1980). The focus on these 
industrial location factors, as well as extensions of Weber’s industrial location theories, played a 
major role in the movement of the petroleum industry to the gulf coast.  
Growth of the Petroleum Industry 
 By 1920, petroleum demand was skyrocketing. The petroleum industry previously had 
focused on producing kerosene for lighting. However, with the growing numbers of automobiles 
and other internal combustion engine-powered machinery, the industry soon switched their focus 
to gasoline. As demand for gasoline rose (tripling between 1915 and 1921), oil companies were 
able to meet the country’s needs with far fewer facilities, and less crude oil, than they previously 
thought. Not only were economies of scale and agglomeration taking hold to increase efficiency, 
but industry was also creating new technologies at a rapid pace.  
 The first refineries extracted products from crude oil through simple distillation. They 
would heat the oil until certain products, known as fractions, vaporized. These vapors would pass 
through cooling tubes where they could condense and workers would collect them. Gasoline is 
the first fraction extracted using this process, followed by naphtha, kerosene, gas oil, and finally 
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heavy oil. Refineries could further process heavy oil to create wax, grease, asphalt, or fuel for 
industrial boilers. This distillation process, though, was rather unsophisticated, as operators could 
not precisely control the distillation temperatures. They also had to peer through “look-boxes”, 
using only visual estimates of color and density to judge when the proper fraction was being 
distilled. Soon, refiners developed a new, more efficient method known as thermal cracking. 
This method used pressure, along with heat, to divide larger hydrocarbon molecules into the 
smaller, more useful fractions. In 1914, Indiana Standard was the first company to utilize this 
method in their refinery. Thermal cracking resulted in more gasoline per barrel of crude oil, and 
a smaller amount of the less desirable kerosene and gas oil. In fact, refineries could transform 
almost all of the gas oil fraction into gasoline (Gorman 2001). Cracking procedures became so 
popular that between 1919 and 1941, the proportion of gasoline derived from cracking units rose 
from 16 percent to 51 percent. By the late 1930s, refiners developed catalytic cracking, which 
made the process even more efficient using catalysts. This new process also increased the scale 
of operations by allowing continuous-flow processing, instead of only processing one batch of 
crude oil at a time. Furthermore, the use of catalysts allowed for processing under much less 
extreme temperatures and pressures (Chapman 1991). Refiners were not only able to increase the 
amount of usable products, but also to improve their quality. The development of alkylation units 
allowed refiners to combine light gases in larger molecules, which resulted in a gasoline with a 
much higher octane. 
 These advances in petroleum refining contributed to a massive industrialization of the 
country in the four decades between 1920 and 1960. In fact, between 1929 and 1954 there was a 
60 percent increase in manufacturing employment, while the total value of industry in the United 
States quadrupled (Fuchs 1962). In the petroleum industry, the total number of refineries actually 
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dropped, from 508 in 1927 to 355 in 1950. Despite this, productivity increased, from 2.3 million 
barrels per day to 6 million barrels per day, due to economies of scale, economies of 
agglomeration, and increasingly efficient processing.  
 One of the most influential factors in the growth of the petroleum industry was federal 
funding for wartime mobilization. This massive federal investment was a component of the 
emerging Fordist economic regime, which included a social democratic welfare state (Tickell & 
Peck 1992). After the Depression, the federal government became intimately involved with the 
growth of state economies, especially in the South. World War II became another opportunity for 
the federal government to assist the states with economic growth. Private companies had doubts 
over whether plants built to fulfill specific wartime needs would be profitable after the war, so 
the federal government funded the construction of these facilities through the Defense Plant 
Corporation (DPC). The DPC was a sub-agency of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
(RFC), whose greater task was to help fund the war effort. The DPC paid for the construction of 
industrial facilities (a $7 billion total investment), which it then leased to the operating 
companies. Of all the funds invested towards industrial expansion for the war, 80 percent came 
from the federal government (Witte 1943). By the end of the war, the DPC would own between 
10 and 12 percent of the nation's total industrial capacity (Duryee 1942, White 1949). 
 Much of the federal investment went towards the petroleum industry, and helped 
accelerate the ongoing process of decentralization (Melosi 2000). World War II was America’s 
first massively mechanized war effort, and thus required an enormous surplus of petroleum 
products. Between 1939 and 1945 there was a 29 percent increase in operating capacity, mostly 
funded by federal programs (Chapman 1991). The federal government upgraded numerous plants 
and refineries, but much of the federal investment went to building new plants. These plants 
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were bigger than any built before, and boasted the most sophisticated equipment, controls, and 
processes of the time. The war effort required these new high-tech plants because the federal 
government had identified multiple petroleum products as strategic war materials, and asked the 
petroleum refining industry to switch their focus from supplying the nation’s motorists to 
supplying these specialty products. First, the nation’s air forces required unprecedented amounts 
of high-octane aviation fuel, and this called for substantial changes in both processes and 
equipment at the nation’s refineries. They needed not only to increase output, but also to produce 
gasoline of a much higher-octane specification than ever before. Refiners achieved this goal first 
by increasing the tetraethyl lead content, but “the most important result of the aviation fuel 
program was to accelerate the introduction of the new technology of catalytic cracking” 
(Chapman 1991: 72). The war effort also required toluene for the manufacture of explosives, and 
the same catalytic cracking processes that produced aviation gasoline could create toluene. 
Catalytic cracking allowed refiners to transform more of each barrel of crude oil into high-octane 
and high-quality products, but these products were not in demand during peacetime. Industry 
would have introduced them into the process stream much more slowly if not for the needs of the 
war economy.  
 However, the wartime product that had the most significant impact on the petroleum 
industry was synthetic rubber. Japanese forces had overrun the sources of most of the world’s 
natural rubber supply in southeast Asia and the south Pacific. Because of this, the United States 
needed to find a reliable source of synthetic rubber quickly. Luckily, companies were already 
researching ways to create synthetic rubber before the war. The Germans had produced small 
quantities of synthetic rubber during World War I to overcome a rubber shortage. Since then, 
research on synthetic rubbers had a high priority in Germany. In the interwar period, American 
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companies built on German research to develop their own synthetic rubbers. Their motives were 
more commercial than political, as they hoped to create rubbers with unique properties for niche 
and specialty markets. They focused on creating synthetic rubber from petroleum instead of from 
coal, as German companies were doing. This would be a much cheaper process, but it took years 
to perfect. The key intermediate for making synthetic rubber was butadiene, and a Joint 
American Study Company plant in Baton Rouge, Louisiana was able to convert petroleum 
refinery products into butadiene by the mid-1930s. Unfortunately, the process they developed 
was too expensive to create a product that could compete with natural rubber, and synthetic 
rubber seemed to be an unprofitable pursuit. As war loomed, however, American companies 
recognized the possible strategic significance of synthetic rubber, and intensified their research. 
The creation in 1940 of the Rubber Reserve Company, a federal agency that purchased and 
stockpiled natural rubber, helped confirm their hunch. By 1942, when the Japanese had 
overtaken the rubber plantations, the United States government had developed a plan for the 
creation of a national synthetic rubber industry. The federal government, through the Defense 
Plant Corporation, would fund the construction and operation of new butadiene and synthetic 
rubber facilities. Production of most of the butadiene and other intermediates, such as styrene, 
would be the overseen by petroleum companies, while the copolymerization and fabrication 
would be performed by rubber companies (Chapman 1991).  
 Another positive effect of the war effort was the cooperative environment that allowed 
the development of these new processes and procedures. All of the petroleum companies were 
working towards the common goal of winning the war. Consequently, the diffusion of 
information was much swifter than it would have been during peacetime. Companies shared 
results from government-funded research, as all involved parties agreed that this was essential 
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for meeting wartime production goals. Patriotism notwithstanding, operators of these 
government-funded plants cooperated because they knew that they would hold a very favorable 
position in the post-war economy. The federal government planned to sell all of these war plants 
back to the private sector after the war. Particularly in the petroleum refining industry, many of 
the government-built plants were an integrated part of the refining facility, which meant that 
refining companies would have a significant advantage over other potential post-war bidders.  
 In fact, World War II and the subsequent federal wartime investment had such an impact 
on industry both during hostilities and in the post-war economy that one could describe it as the 
catalyst for what C. Freeman (1987) calls a technological revolution. Changes in an economic 
sector constitute a technological revolution if they result in new branches of the economy and 
new product groups. They also must affect other branches of the economy by transforming 
methods of production and cost structures (Freeman 1987). The wartime changes in the 
petroleum industry constituted a technological revolution not only because helped increase the 
scale and efficiency of refining methods, but also because they signaled the beginning of the 
petrochemical industry. Thousands of new organic chemical products were on the market after 
World War II, and the petrochemical industry would become a major force in post-war America 
(Melosi 2000). It would also revolutionize many other sectors of industry and the economy with 
its intermediate products. For instance, plastics, synthetic fibers, and synthetic rubbers would 
become a major part of consumers’ lives, and would modernize production and packaging 
processes for many other industries. All of this change would be even more significant for the 
Gulf Coast, as the petroleum and petrochemical industries grew to become a major economic 
force in the region. The intermediate products of these industries would link the area with 
markets across the country and the world.  
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 Thus, the petroleum industry was at the forefront of the decentralization of industry in 
America. Growing demand for petroleum products such as gasoline facilitated the growth of this 
nascent industry. Eventually wartime demands resulted in accelerated technical advances and 
growth, funded by the federal government. During World War II, and especially post-war, the 
Gulf Coast would emerge as the top choice for mobile companies looking for a place to expand.  
Its low-cost resources, cheap land, cheap labor, and access to transportation would draw many 
industrialists. The ensuing growth would transform parts of an entire region from a rural 
agricultural landscape to an urban, industrial one and link the region to the rest of the country 
and the world. 
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Chapter 3 
Industry Comes to the South 
 When industry turned its eye towards the South in the early twentieth century, Southern 
governments saw an opportunity for progress and modernization. They saw a chance to turn 
what was historically a rural, poor, agricultural region into one that could compete with the rest 
of the country economically. With the onset of the Depression, however, this excitement quickly 
turned to desperation, and local and state governments would do anything to bring jobs and 
capital to their area. This led to the movement known as business progressivism, which 
combined boosterism and government reform (Cobb 1993). Boosterism consisted of local 
officials and members of the business community placing advertisements, mailing promotional 
materials, and making personal visits to industry leaders, all for promoting their particular city or 
state. They compiled statistics on available labor forces and tax rates, searched out possible sites 
for industrial facilities, and made promises of free buildings, low taxes, and low-wage workers. 
By the 1940s, almost every Southern state had this type of program (Wright 1986). An 
interesting example of this was the Florida Industrial Air Tour. In 1946, the Florida Chamber of 
Commerce promoted a tour from the air of industrial sites that had gone idle since the end of the 
war. They hoped that this glamorous event would convince Northern executives that Florida was 
the ideal place for expansion (Cobb 1993). As well as promoting their areas, government 
officials were also attempting to modernize state and local governments, and improve public 
facilities and infrastructure, all in the hopes of attracting industry. The Depression had given 
Southern governments a new notion of their responsibilities in the economic growth of their 
state, and they now flung themselves headlong into the fight to attract industry. The notion 
behind these state-sponsored campaigns to recruit industry was that economic growth could 
solve the problems of the South. With an influx of capital and jobs, governments thought they 
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could improve roads, public education, and public health services (Cobb 1984). This prolonged 
commitment to industrial growth had its roots in the agricultural modifications caused by the 
Depression and the boll weevil’s destruction of the cotton economy.  
Incentives to Industry  
 One enticement local and state governments offered to incoming industry was a tax 
exemption plan. Louisiana’s industrial development program, designed to attract “large-scale 
industrial development,” kicked off with this method of indirect subsidy (Rainey 1967: 4). A 
1936 state constitutional amendment exempted all new industry from state and local ad valorem 
taxes for ten years (State of Louisiana 1955). The amendment passed by an 87 percent majority. 
It also created the Department of Commerce and Industry to oversee the program and negotiate 
contracts with new industry. The Department additionally supervised an advertising campaign 
used to attract manufacturers by promoting Louisiana’s natural resources, climate, non-union 
labor, and the tax exemption program (Rainey 1967). The program, however, would not accept 
just any company. In an effort to promote industrial diversification and protect existing industry, 
the state did not allow companies that would compete with nearby industries to participate. Only 
if the company received the written permission of the local competing industry could it apply for 
the exemption:  
No exemption shall be contracted for any new manufacturing establishment in any 
locality where there is a manufacturing establishment actually engaged in the 
manufacture of the same or closely competitive articles without the written consent of the 
owner of such existing manufacturing establishment... (State of Louisiana 1955: 257).  
 
One of Louisiana’s most valuable features was its agricultural diversity, which protected against 
a devastating loss of jobs and revenue in case of disaster. As environmental historian Albert 
Cowdrey writes, “...the simplest ecological systems are the easiest to destabilize, since they lack 
the multiple checks of more complex ones” (Cowdrey 1983: 110). It seems that state legislators 
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were showing impressive foresight in attempting to extend this safety net to industry in 
Louisiana. However, the Board of Directors of the Department of Commerce and Industry held 
the final judgment of what industry was a “competing” industry. It tended to interpret 
competitiveness very loosely, along with the definition of a business applying for the program as 
a “manufacturing establishment” (Rainey 1967). By 1950, the state had given 1,059 exemptions 
on industrial properties worth $573 million. However, industry still considered Louisiana a high-
tax state because, once the exemption expired, the plant was assessed at 100 percent of the 
property value. In other states that figure was much lower (Cobb 1993). 
 The tax exemptions, while well meaning, were controversial across the South. Critics 
argued that tax exemptions relinquished the only universally beneficial result on industrial 
expansion. New jobs only benefit those who have them, but thousand or millions of dollars in 
taxes can benefit the whole community. Critics argued that these funds were especially crucial 
because of the extra services required by industrial expansion. New workers were arriving along 
with the modern industrial complex, and these citizens required more roads, schools, hospitals, 
and other services. Defenders of the exemption plan argued that if it did not exist, industry would 
simply not come, and no new jobs would be created. They viewed the loss of industry taxes as an 
acceptable sacrifice for a new payroll, and reminded the critics that the exemption would expire 
in five or ten years. Location theorists, on the other hand, claimed that tax exemptions were not 
even a concern for relocating industry. They believed that industry leaders were more worried 
about services available for their workers, services that would suffer if there were an increase in 
population with no increase in tax revenue. In fact, some companies even insisted on paying their 
fair share, such as when International Paper turned down an already-approved bond issue for a 
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new pulp mill in Natchez. For the most part, however, companies accepted the tax exemptions, 
even if it was not their primary motive for choosing the location (Cobb 1993).  
 For Louisiana, many agree that the tax exemption program was not a major factor in the 
industrialization of the state. In an impressive master’s thesis, Ronald Rainey addresses this issue 
by combining many studies of the state’s industrial inducement program with economic data. He 
concludes that the program most likely accounted for less than 10 percent of industrial 
investment in the state. He also argues that the program most likely did more harm than good by 
depriving the state and local governments of much-needed tax revenue. In twenty-five years of 
the program, the state gave exemptions on $4.6 billion worth of investment. For the years 1956-
1965, details on which industries received exemptions are available. Using this, Rainey shows 
that the attempt to attract diverse industries was also an abject failure, with the large majority of 
exemptions (65 percent) going to the petroleum and petrochemical industries. The next industry 
on the list was the electric power industry, with a paltry 10 percent. The dominance of the 
petroleum and petrochemical industries in this program is also evident in Rainey’s estimates of 
the revenue losses for 1961. He estimates that parish governments lost a total of $13 million in 
that year. Calcasieu Parish, filled with petroleum and petrochemical industry, accounted for $2.1 
million of that loss, or 16 percent (Rainey 1967). 
 A second method of attracting industry was to offer subsidies on industrial sites, 
buildings, or equipment. For example, governments would subsidize the construction of a new 
factory building and offer the building to an interested industrial firm, often at little or no cost. 
By providing a specially made building, state and local officials made relocation as painless as 
possible for Northern industries. The Depression years saw the most desperate, and sometimes 
dishonest, subsidizations to attract industry. Sometimes governments illegally deducted the funds 
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to subsidize the buildings from worker’s paychecks. Another scheme was to appropriate public 
money to construct buildings ostensibly for municipal use, such as town halls and community 
centers, using the buildings once for their intended purpose, and then selling or giving them to 
incoming industry (Cobb 1984).  
 One of the most prominent and impressive government subsidy programs was 
Mississippi’s Balance Agriculture With Industry, or BAWI. The act containing the BAWI 
program, proposed by the governor, passed in September 1936. It allowed municipalities to issue 
bonds, known as industrial development bonds, for financing the construction of industrial 
buildings. The governor gained support for this bill, argued by some to be unconstitutional, by 
framing it in the language of the New Deal, which had done so much good for the citizens of the 
state in years past. He reasoned that providing employment was a legitimate way of providing for 
the general welfare, and was therefore within the domain of state and local governments. 
Economists argue about how much of an impact BAWI had on the location decisions of 
incoming industry in Mississippi. The administrators of the program were quick to take credit for 
all the employment gains of the period, but others contend that Mississippi’s vast supply of 
cheap labor was more important in industrialists’ location decisions. However, the fact remains 
that industrial employment in the state rose dramatically during the BAWI period, and the wages 
brought to the state far exceeded the investment in the program. By 1950, over 10,000 employees 
worked at plants that had taken advantage of the BAWI program, and the amounts of bonds 
issued only totaled 3 percent of the total wages of these workers (Cobb 1993).  
 Louisiana modeled its industrial development bond program after Mississippi’s BAWI 
and programs in other states such as Kentucky, Alabama, Illinois, and Tennessee (Rainey 1967). 
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A 1952 amendment to the state constitution allowed city and parish governments to finance the 
construction of facilities for incoming industry through bond issues: 
Any parish, ward, or municipality of this State, in order to encourage the location of or 
addition to industrial enterprises therein may incur debt and issue negotiable bonds...and 
use such funds derived from sale of such bonds...to acquire industrial plant sites... or 
acquire or construct industrial plant buildings...and may sell [or] lease...to any enterprise 
locating or existing within such parish, ward, or municipality. 
         (State of Louisiana 1955: 315). 
 
This program held multiple advantages for all involved. Rental payments by industry were 
deductible as a business expense, interest on the bonds was exempt from federal income tax, and 
industrial property owned by local governments was exempt from ad valorem property taxes. 
However, bonds were generally used only by smaller cities to attract small to medium sized 
firms. The majority of bonds issued attracted industries such as food and forest products. In 
addition, most of the bond issues were very small, thus the incoming industry probably only 
served the local area. Rainey concludes that this program, like the tax exemption, attracted little 
industry that was not already intent on locating in Louisiana. By 1963, twenty-three states had 
similar programs. The spread of these programs negated any advantage Southern states may have 
gained from adopting them. However, the program operated at no cost to the local community, 
thus doing no harm. (Rainey 1967).  
 The third method of attracting industry was for local business leaders to offer loans to 
new industry. These businessmen organized themselves into groups known as private 
development corporations or local industrial development corporations, and raised public money 
to finance the loans. This type of group first appeared in 1916 in Louisville, Kentucky, and soon 
became increasingly common throughout the South, especially in the years after World War II. 
In 1962, the Louisiana amended the act authorizing industrial development bonds to allow 
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private development corporations within the state (Rainey 1967). They usually dealt with smaller 
businesses, and not only offered loans, but also sometimes constructed buildings, which they 
then rented to new companies. They frequently worked with a limited amount of capital raised 
by community and business donations. Thus, they generally made medium-term loans to 
businesses, and only made new loans once enough of the money was paid back to cover the new 
loan (Cobb 1993). 
 This group of industrial incentives, however, also had negatives consequences. First, 
incentives put communities in a bad bargaining position. The communities had invested so much 
in the industry already that they would do anything to keep it, especially if it was the only 
industry in town. In addition, subsidies tended to attract industries that needed subsidies the 
most, which were usually low-wage operations. These industries produced very little growth 
because of their small size and low wages. The community found it harder to attract more 
industry because of the slow growth. They would then create more subsidies and incentives, 
generating a cycle that produced almost nothing worthwhile for the community. This also meant 
that, although industrial growth may have brought economic progress to some parts of the South, 
it did not bring much social progress. The South was still dependant on labor-intensive, low-
wage, extractive operations, and thus retained its antebellum status of a peripheral, almost 
colonial, region. This is evident in that the main sales pitch of community leaders to industrialists 
was the cheap, non-union labor, along with cheap raw materials and resources. That many of the 
incoming industry’s products did not remain in the region was especially apparent for the 
petroleum industry, as the vast majority of the finished products from the Southern refineries 
flowed by pipeline or barge to the Northeast. Thus, Northern industry could expand to the South 
to take advantage of cheap raw materials and underpaid, non-union labor, and at the same time, 
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their new communities gave them free buildings, tax breaks, and anything else that would 
convince them to stay.  
 These extractive, low-wage industries were also not the kind that promoted the rapid 
urban growth for which everyone had hoped. Consequently, pre-WWII Southern cities remained 
dependant on agriculture, and the social and political status quo remained. Industry could 
continue drawing its labor from a pool of poor, rural workers, paying them very little, and never 
have to worry about unionization. Even though the South was industrializing and growing during 
the 1930s, during this period the wage gap between the South and the North actually increased. 
In 1907, the average Southern wage was 86 percent of the average Northeastern wage, but by 
1932, it had dropped to 74 percent. It would take another World War to bring the South out of 
this stagnation. Federal investment for wartime mobilization during the 1940s closed the wage 
gap to previous levels, bringing the percentage back up to 84 percent of the average Northeastern 
wage. The industries that flooded in during World War II were more technically complex 
industries, such as petroleum refining, airplane manufacturing, and chemical munitions 
production. These offered higher wages than the textile mills which became prevalent in the 
South during the 1930s (Cobb 1993). In addition, the federal government funded their 
construction, so the businesses that ran them were less concerned with cutting financial corners.  
Federal Influence 
 Traditionally, economic and sociological theorists have stated that federal government 
intervention in regional economic development is unnatural, and discount the state’s ability to 
affect this sort of growth. Gregory Hooks, however, joins a growing list of researchers who argue 
that the federal government has had a significant influence on regional economic development 
(Hooks 2001). The most prominent example of this is the federal defense program, especially 
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during World War II. The economic mobilization for World War II was unique, and had a major 
influence on the industrialization of the South. During the war, the federal government spent $4 
billion on Southern military facilities and $4.4 billion on Southern war-related industry. This 
investment expanded the South’s industrial capacity by an estimated 40 percent (Cobb 1984). 
Farm laborers and sharecroppers poured out of rural areas to join the industrial boom. Low-wage 
agricultural opportunities were fast disappearing, and millions of people were looking for work. 
Luckily, federal investment gave these people somewhere to go (Wright 1986).The federal 
wartime expansion was not restricted to the South, and by the end of the war, the federal 
government owned 40 percent of the entire nation’s industrial assets. Hooks finds that, overall, 
the South was actually the focus of fewer federal industrial investments than the rest of the 
country. At the time, the weaponry needed for the war was not too different from products 
already manufactured by American industry. Since the industrial base already existed in the 
Northeast and Midwest, it was much easier to convert these plants for wartime needs than build 
completely new plants in an area with less infrastructure. Thus, the federal government directed 
much of their investment towards these traditional manufacturing areas. Because of the non-
industrial character of the pre-war South, however, federal investment may have had a more 
lasting impact on the region than on other regions. Investment in the Northeast and Midwest only 
served to expand the concentration of mature industries in urban areas, which may have 
contributed to later deindustrialization. In the South, however, the investment may have 
contributed to the creation of a manufacturing base and infrastructure to support it (Hooks 2001). 
The model proposed by Crump (1989) of cumulative causation holds that the original siting of an 
industrial facility in a region gives that region an advantage in securing future contracts, along 
with the influence a new industry had on the rest of the community, such as on population, 
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services, and the commercial sector. When Hooks (2001) applied this model to his research on 
the South, he found that though the region received proportionally less investment than the rest 
of the country during the war years, the federally funded facilities in the South were much more 
likely to stimulate industrial growth over the next forty years than facilities in non-Southern 
cities.  
Southern Industrial Growth 
 Federal wartime investment was part of what became a massive industrialization of the 
South. Between 1929 and 1954, employment in the manufacturing sector shot up 60 percent. 
During this time, the South and West experienced a higher industrial growth rate than the 
national average. At the same time, the Midwest remained unchanged, while the Northeast 
experienced a large loss of industry. These two regions still maintained their industrial 
domination, but they were not as influential as they were in 1929. Victor Fuchs' book Changes in 
the Location of Manufacturing in the United States since 1929 breaks each region into smaller 
sub-regions, and traces their industrial character from 1929 to 1954. He utilizes the U.S. Census 
regions, dividing the South into the south Atlantic, the west south central, and the east south 
central (Figure 2). He writes that this period was favorable for all three sub-regions: between 
1929 and 1954 they all showed higher industrial growth than they had between 1904 and 1929. 
During this period, they also surpassed the national industrial growth rate. In addition, 
manufacturing employment in the South was more evenly distributed in 1954 than it was in 
1929, suggesting that the decentralization of industry was a success. In fact, Fuchs found a 
positive correlation during this period between the rate of industrial growth and the tendency for 
industry to become less concentrated. Before this time, the concentration of industry in the 
Northeast and Midwest resulted in other states becoming very dependant on one, or possibly two, 
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industries. By 1954, however, many states enjoyed the security of hosting many different types 
of industry, which helped protect the state's population in case of a downturn in one economic 
sector. This also meant that states' industrial structures skewed less extremely towards either end 
of the favorable/unfavorable spectrum. Economists refer to a state's industrial structure as 
favorable if it contains dynamic, high-growth industries, such as the high-tech industries that 
moved into the South during World War II. The decentralization of industry allowed states to 
host industries with a range of structures, which resulted in higher growth rates and even more 
economic security. 
 
Figure 2. Census Regions  
(Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2007) 
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 Wartime industrialization affected the West South Central (Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, and Texas) more significantly than the East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Alabama, and Mississippi). Between 1929 and 1954, the west south central accounted for only 
two-fifths of the industrial growth of the South as a whole. However, during the post war period 
(1947-1954), the west south central was responsible for four-fifths of the industrial growth of the 
South. In fact, the West South Central was second only to the Pacific region (California, Oregon, 
and Washington) in terms of the rate of growth in industrial employment during that time. 
Federal investment in the region had a major influence on post-war growth, and many of the 
benefits went to Texas and Oklahoma. These two states not only had rapid growth during this 
period, but also a vast improvement in industrial structure. The chemical and aircraft industries 
moved into the west south central during World War II, and concentrated their operations in 
Texas and Oklahoma. The chemical industry also moved into Louisiana and Arkansas, though at 
a much lower concentration than Texas and Oklahoma. The chemical and aircraft industries were 
fast growing, thus improving the states’ industrial structure, and were largely accountable for the 
increase in employment, adding 47,000 and 42,000 jobs, respectively. However, two states in the 
western south central, Arkansas and Louisiana, maintained unfavorable industrial structures 
overall, and thus experienced industrial growth rates approximately equal to the national rate. 
Louisiana did experience a boom in the petroleum industry, along with growth in the fast-
moving chemical industry, but the rapid growth of the upper Texas gulf coast quickly outpaced 
the state’s two industrial agglomerations at Baton Rouge and Lake Charles (Fuchs 1962).  
 While not keeping up with the upper Texas gulf coast, Louisiana (and Lake Charles) 
were seeing large amounts of industrial growth, especially in the petroleum and petrochemical 
industries. In 1947, Calcasieu Parish had two chemical plants that employed between twenty and 
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ninety-nine people each; along with four chemical plants and two petroleum refineries, that each 
had over 100 employees (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1950). By 1958, the parish hosted five 
petroleum refineries, (one of which employed over one thousand people, and two of which 
employed between 500 and 1,000 people) along with a number of smaller refineries and 
chemical plants (U.S. Bureau of Census 1958). The County Business Patterns report shows 
additional employment numbers for the parish, but the quality of the data is mediocre at best. 
Employment in petroleum refining is not available until 1951, even though it was a well-
established economic sector by then. Data for the younger chemical industry becomes available 
in 1948. The reports thus miss the war years and early post-war period, when much of the 
quickest growth was occurring in Lake Charles. Nonetheless, they show a steady climb in 
employment. The petroleum refining sector employed just over 3,000 people in Calcasieu Parish 
in 1951, and employment number grew to just under 4,000 by 1959. The chemical industry data 
is much more complex. New products were entering the market constantly, and every few years 
more sub-categories appeared under the heading of chemical manufacturing. In addition, many 
companies operated both petroleum refineries and multiple chemical units. The companies 
frequently shut down individual chemical units or revamped them to produce different products. 
Thus, the definition of who was working in the “chemical industry” at any one time is 
questionable. This explains the odd nature of the chemical employment data. In 1949, there was 
a sudden drop of 600 employees in the chemical industry, but by the next year, the numbers had 
returned to previous levels. Notwithstanding this aberration, employment in the chemical 
industry hovered just above 2,000, and grew slowly but steadily throughout the 1950s (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1946; U.S. Department of Commerce 1948; U.S. Department of 
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Commerce 1949; U.S. Department of Commerce 1951; U.S. Department of Commerce 1953; 
U.S. Department of Commerce 1959).   
 McMichael (1961) has shown that industry came to Louisiana primarily because of 
natural resources, and Fuchs’ research supports this. Fuchs asserts that the petroleum and 
chemical industries shifted from the Mid-Atlantic to the West South Central and Pacific regions 
mostly because of the draw of cheap natural resources. The chemical industry used petroleum 
and natural gas as the major components of its final products, both of which the western Gulf 
Coast had in abundance. The area also had surpluses of limestone, sulphur, salt, and water, all of 
which the petroleum and chemical industries required for operations. These natural resources 
played more of a factor in the industrial growth of the western south central than did the surplus 
of cheap labor, which was a greater asset to the eastern south central and Atlantic south regions. 
In fact, Fuchs attributes one-third of all interregional shifts in petroleum industry employment to 
the draw of abundant natural resources (Fuchs 1962). 
 I should make two points here. First, the industrial mobility and shifts that resulted in the 
industrialization of the South did not generally involve the physical movement of companies and 
plant facilities. There was not a surge of companies packing up everything and moving to the 
South. Industrial mobility usually meant that companies that had traditionally remained in the 
long-established industrial areas of the Northeast and Midwest were now opening new plants in 
the South. They hired new administrators, executives, and workers, and built new equipment, but 
the corporate headquarters usually remained in the Northeast or Midwest. If the Midwest and 
Northeast seemed to be industrially stagnant during the first half of the twentieth century, it was 
due to the unfavorable industrial structure caused by the multitude of mature industries. These 
industries showed proportionally less growth than the fledgling, favorably structured South. 
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Second, some have made the argument that the South was simply “catching up;” that an area 
historically lacking industry was finally large enough to support it. However, if this were so, 
other non-industrial states would have shown similar growth during this period. In fact, five of 
these states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Montana, and Wyoming) showed 
comparative industrial losses (Fuchs 1962). The factors behind the industrialization of the South 
were too complex for explanation by this simple “catching up” theory. Even though Southern 
states had been attempting to lure industry for decades, the social, political, and economic 
changes that came about in the late 1930s and 1940s finally resulted in significant industrial 
growth. Two of these factors were the scarcity of low-wage opportunities and the “aggressive 
state-level political pressure for the South’s ‘fair share’ of military spending” (Wright 1986: 
240). 
 Many factors facilitated the industrialization of the South. It was a large, populous region 
with abundant natural resources that fit the demands of new twentieth-century industries. 
Transportation infrastructure was growing (e.g. the Intracoastal Canal, pipeline networks), which 
allowed industry greater access to resources and markets. Cheap labor was readily available in 
this area, which was still adjusting to the agricultural changes brought by mechanization, the 
Depression, and the boll weevil. Local governments, reeling financially from these changes, 
committed themselves to saving the South through industrial growth.  
Pollution for Progress 
 When heavy industry came to the South, it was a much different experience than the 
industrialization of the Northeast and Midwest. Industrialization in the South largely consisted of 
outsiders invading to take advantage of natural resources and cheap labor (Cowdrey 1983). The 
South was thus still unable to shake its position as a colony of Northern business. In addition, 
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industry in the Northern traditional manufacturing areas generally grew within or near extant 
metropolitan areas. In the South, however, the vast majority of industrialization occurred in rural 
areas or cities much smaller than the Northeast/Midwest. Companies, especially those in the 
petroleum industry, focused their location decisions on proximity to natural resources and rural 
surpluses of farm labor. The growing Southern transportation infrastructure allowed companies 
to build in rural areas. In many cases, the location was so desirable to industry that infrastructure 
was created solely for the manufacturer.  
 Lake Charles is an excellent example of all of these aspects of Southern industrialization. 
In the early twentieth century, it was a small, rural city with a labor surplus due to the 
mechanization of agriculture and the downturn of the forest industry. Lumber companies moved 
into the area in the 1890s from the already-cut Northern forests, and quickly began denuding the 
western Louisiana landscape. In 1892 alone, the Lake Charles sawmill cut 150 million board feet 
of lumber. Some of the larger mills in the region could cut an entire section of land in a few 
weeks, and by 1905, two thousand miles of logging railroads had spread throughout the western 
Louisiana (Stokes 1957). By the 1930s, however, the lumber industry was on the decline in this 
region. The labor surplus this created, along with the wealth of natural resources, would be very 
enticing to incoming industry. Local leaders were more than pleased to have industry in their 
town, and constructed infrastructure to ease the transition. Parish government constructed the 
Cities Service Highway, west of Lake Charles, as a direct path from Highway 90 (the major east-
west thoroughfare) to the new refinery. In addition, a housing development company constructed 
an entirely new community, known as Maplewood, to house company employees (Ross 1990). 
 The influx of industry to take advantage of all of these incentives contributed to many 
changes in Southern society. In 1929, the Southern per capita income was a paltry 47 percent of 
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the national average, but by 1948, that number had risen to 64 percent (although half of that 
growth came between 1940 and 1945, spurred on by the federal wartime investment). 
Industrialization in the 1940s finally brought some significant changes to the South, including 
massive shifts in the work force. The percentage employed in agriculture dropped from 35 
percent to 22 percent, and the percentage employed in manufacturing increased from 15 percent 
to 18 percent. The population of Southern cities also grew by 30 percent during this period. The 
trend continued into the 1950s, so that the change from 1940 to 1960 is even more dramatic. The 
South’s population shifted from a rural majority (65 percent) to an urban one (58 percent), and 
by 1960 agricultural employment had dropped to 10 percent of the workforce (Cobb 1984). With 
urbanization and industrial growth, however, comes an increase in pollution sources, especially 
water pollution. This would quickly become a problem requiring the attention of the authorities. 
Nevertheless, the political and economic leaders of Southern states were thrilled about this 
modernization and economic growth; it had been the driving force behind thirty years of 
recruitment efforts. The last thing they wanted to do was slap regulations onto the industry they 
had worked so hard to attract. With so much local money invested in these firms, it was not very 
likely that local governments would question them about their waste disposal programs. 
Consequently, the fact that industry was needed so badly by Southern cities seemed to guarantee 
for them regulation-free operation. 
 Although some Southern states did pass a few pollution regulations and give some state 
agencies authority over pollution, they still gained a reputation for accommodating industry and 
looking the other way when confronted with pollution problems. The shift from a rural, 
agricultural landscape to an urban one was dominated by industry focused on intensive resource 
extraction, and resulted in major environmental modifications and pollution. Many of the 
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resources, especially petroleum, were located within the great Southern river swamp complexes 
and the modification or draining of these (willfully done for the sake of industrial progress) 
meant the loss of an important natural landscape. These river swamps functioned as a natural 
filter of silt, organic materials, and toxic chemicals, as well as serving as reservoir and habitat for 
an entire biotic community (Berry & Horton 1974). The fact that many Southern governments 
looked the other way while this type of destructive activity was occurring has led many scholars 
to conclude that the South experienced great economic growth because of lax pollution 
regulations. In fact, “before 1972 polluters had little to fear from any level of government”, 
argues Albert Cowdrey (1983: 175). Examples are easy to find; in central Florida, the phosphate 
industry significantly reduced air quality through its emissions. Industrial leaders were extremely 
resistant to any pollution regulations, and held much economic and political power over the area 
and the state. Unfortunately, the state government’s reluctance to confront industry “was more 
typical than extraordinary” (Dewey 1999: 602).  
 In Louisiana, the Stream Control Commission was also guilty of this reluctance. In 1940, 
the Louisiana legislature formed this group, and appointed representatives from the Department 
of Conservation (later known as the Department of Fish and Wild Life), The State Board of 
Health, and the Attorney General’s office as its members. The mandate of the Stream Control 
Commission was to  
…have control of waste disposal, either public or private…into any of the lake, rivers, 
and streams of the state...and of the coastal waters of the Gulf of Mexico…for the 
prevention of pollution thereof tending to destroy fish life, or to be injurious to the public 
health or the public welfare or other aquatic life or wild or domestic animals and fowls.  
       (State of Louisiana 1940: 1370) 
 
Despite their given mission, the SCC consistently allowed industry to use the waters of the state 
as a dumping ground. Members were especially lenient with industry along the Mississippi 
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River, allowing companies to use it as an industrial sink throughout the 1950s and 1960s (Colten 
2000). The body generally maintained a cooperative relationship with industry, and only stepped 
in during cases of serious pollution, usually the kind that would constitute a public relations 
threat for both industry and state government. These piecemeal, ad hoc responses would become 
the norm for state governments as a whole, with officials consistently focusing their efforts on 
one type or instance of pollution instead of addressing industrial pollution control as a whole 
(Colten 2001). 
 At the local level, government was more sympathetic to people affected by pollution. 
Local judges and juries usually sided with rural landowners in early Louisiana pollution cases, 
but refused to confront industry; they “sought to compensate those who suffered from industrial 
pollution while refusing to impose injunctions on manufacturing activity” (Colten 2000: 144). In 
addition, once industry filed an appeal, state-level appellate judges usually reduced the amounts 
awarded to the plaintiffs (Colten 2000). Industry also had support from the state legislative and 
executive branches. The Louisiana governor’s office was extremely powerful and legislators held 
very long terms, meaning that both of these branches of government were extremely susceptible 
to monetary influence from the agricultural or industrial lobby (Allen 2003). Some of the only 
actions the state government took that infringed on industrial operations were acts passed in the 
1910s and 1920s to protect farmers using irrigation from oilfield brine discharges (Colten 2000). 
 The access to power enjoyed by incoming industry, along with the fact that tax breaks 
and development programs attracted almost exclusively low-wage, extractive industries, meant 
that nightmares of radical social change remained unrealized. These industries, while bringing 
unprecedented economic growth to the region, kept the political/social/racial hierarchy firmly in 
place (Scranton 2001). Without radical change, the Southern states maintained their image of 
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“good ole boy” politics: corrupt and wasteful officials lining their pockets with money from the 
agricultural, business and industrial lobbies. This image, along with the concentrated efforts of 
these local and state governments to attract industry and their general dismissal of the pollution 
problem that would follow, led many to conclude that the South accepted pollution in exchange 
for economic progress.  
 The impression of a great Faustian deal, however, is at least partly a myth. While state 
leaders may have shied away from environmental regulations for fear of being labeled anti-
development, the presence or absence of these regulations was generally not a concern in 
industrial location decisions (South 1986). Even if regulations were present, industrialists usually 
did not take them seriously because of the nature of local and state politics; industry leaders 
knew they could use their influence to reduce or remove the regulations. In addition, the costs of 
regulation were not a great enough percentage of total site costs to worry industrial firms 
(Storper et el. 1980). A 1922 industrial handbook listed possible lawsuits and regulations as a 
concern, but placed it seventh on the list of important industrial location factors, well below 
other issues such as transportation infrastructure and proximity to natural resources (Gorman 
2001). The weak position of state regulators is evident in the actions of the Louisiana Stream 
Control Commission. The act that created the SCC decreed that the body should “establish 
pollution standards for lakes, rivers, streams, and other waters of the State” (State of Louisiana 
1940: 1371). In 1958 correspondence C.A. Burns, the chief chemist of the Columbia-Southern 
Chemical Corporation in Lake Charles, requested information from the SCC on stream pollution 
law or regulations pertaining to the Calcasieu River. Kenneth Biglane, executive secretary of the 
SCC, assured Mr. Burns that the regulatory body did not have set standards for any stream in 
Louisiana, but rather evaluated each application for waste disposal individually (Biglane 1958). 
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Without standards, the SCC members decided whether each addition to the pollution load would 
render the waterway unsafe. The American Petroleum Institute would later utilize this same 
strategy in their argument against pollution regulations. Throughout the twenty years between 
1940 and 1960, SCC members consistently approved waste disposal applications on both the 
Mississippi and Calcasieu Rivers (Colten 2000; SCC Minutes 1940-1960). With this record, if 
the SCC was a factor in industrial location decisions, they most likely served as another reason 
for industry to locate in Louisiana. 
 Moreover, the myth of “pollution for progress” incorrectly assumes that the general 
citizenry were part of the deal. Colten (2006, 2001) has shown that this was not the case, at least 
in Louisiana and Texas, where he traces “the details of internal struggles at the local scale” 
which are usually glossed over by “sweeping claims that the southern states ignored 
environmental concerns” (Colten 2001: 162). On the upper Texas Gulf Coast, wartime 
industrialization had increased the amount of pollution flowing into waterways, eventually 
“attracting the displeasure of Lone Star sportsmen” (Colten 2001: 146). The Texas Game, Fish, 
and Oyster Commission took heed of the public cry and shouldered the responsibility for 
pollution regulation enforcement. However, conflicting state policies and limited resources for 
enforcement meant that industry continued to flow in while pollution abatement efforts remained 
inconsistent, despite the public outcry.  
  A similar situation arose in Louisiana. The first federal intervention into water pollution 
issues was at the tiny Corney Creek in the northern part of the state. An interstate water dispute 
had arisen over oilfield waste from Arkansas that was flowing into Louisiana. The brine and oils 
were ruining the sportfishing in Corney Creek and Corney Lake, and the locals were very upset. 
They brought the issue to the parish police juries who then took the case directly to federal 
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authorities, suggesting their lack of faith in state authorities’ willingness to punish industry 
(Colten 2006). This lack of faith was well founded, from the SCC’s cooperative relationship with 
industry to the state appellate courts’ reduction of awards in pollution nuisance suits. Colten’s 
research does show that, despite the nonchalance of state authorities, rural citizens in Louisiana 
took offense to, and action against, new pollution threats.  This paper will investigate many of 
the same issues. The major difference, however, will be that Lake Charles was a quickly growing 
urban area at the time of industrialization, while Corney Creek was still very rural. 
 Industrialization generally conjures images of urban areas, but industry had a major 
impact on rural areas as well, especially the petroleum industry. Oil companies relocated to the 
South to be near the oil reserves, but refinery location decisions more often revolved around 
transportation infrastructure. Thus, two facets of petroleum industry emerged: production and 
refining. Production facilities (oil wells and pumps), situated anywhere oil was found, were very 
likely to impact rural areas. Refineries usually located beside rivers, or in urban areas with 
established transportation infrastructure, for easy transportation of crude and finished products. 
This research will examine whether urban citizens in Lake Charles were just as likely to take 
action against new pollution problems as rural Louisiana citizens were. 
Regional Differences in Pollution Control 
 The South as an industrial zone is very different from the traditional manufacturing areas 
of the Northeast and Midwest. The South developed much later, with different industries, and for 
much different reasons. The region also showed unique responses to the pollution that followed 
industrialization. In the 1930s, the Northeast and Midwest produced 75 percent of United States 
sewage, along with producing the greatest concentration of industrial wastes (Melosi 2000). It 
was a much more densely populated region, with many large cities obtaining their water supply 
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from the same rivers, lakes, and harbors that other cities and industry were using as a dumping 
ground. Consequently, for most of the region, public health was the first and primary concern in 
regards to municipal and industrial pollution. Most of these states assigned their public health 
service the primary duty of monitoring and enforcing pollution regulations. In the South, 
however, public health was not such a concern, at least as far as municipal pollution was 
concerned: 
For the most part, larger rivers in the humid South could dilute the relatively small 
discharges from the modest-sized interior cities while the regions largest cities – New 
Orleans, Washington, and Houston – had no downstream neighbors to speak of.  
         (Colten 2006: 608) 
 
Lake Charles could be included in this list, as it had no downstream neighbors except for a few 
small fishing towns near the coast. However, the Calcasieu River is not a diluting machine like 
the Mississippi. It has a very low gradient and becomes a tidal stream during periods of low 
rainfall, actually flowing backwards during high tides.  
 With public health out of the picture, at stake were wildlife, agriculture, and other natural 
resources. These were community resources: people survived on local crops, wildlife, and fish, 
and the destruction of these would seriously damage a community’s livelihood. The Corney 
Creek case demonstrates this point quite well. Sportfishing was not simply a hobby for northern 
Louisianans; it was a tradition, a source of food, and a way of life. The threat to sportfishing was 
such a serious issue for citizens that they fought until they successfully secured federal help. This 
was not a small task for a rural Louisiana parish. This was just as serious an issue in 
southwestern Louisiana. Gay Gomez’s book A Wetland Biography: Seasons on the Chenier 
Plain traces the importance of wildlife and fish in the lives of people living in the marshes south 
of Lake Charles, downstream of what would become a large industrial agglomeration. All year, 
these people’s lives revolved around the natural resources in their environment. Different 
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seasons brought cattle herding, rice and citrus farming, hunting, fishing, and trapping. They 
farmed, hunted, and fished for subsistence, but also for the market:  the oyster and shrimp 
industries were a major part of the economy. However, by the 1920s and 1930s, these rural 
citizens had lost some economic opportunities. The Mexican pink worm devastated cotton crops 
and the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1918 outlawed killing certain waterfowl for market sale. This 
decline coincided with the arrival of the oil industry, and many men went to work in the oil 
fields. Those who stayed behind focused more on cattle herding, hunting, and fishing for 
subsistence, and harvesting oysters and shrimp for the market. Thus, while industry was 
congregating upstream, a large community of people was still surviving on the natural bounty of 
the marshes, rivers, and Gulf.  
 The state government’s first actions against industry focused on these natural resources. 
As early as the 1910s, the state passed regulations against polluting water used for irrigation or 
fishing. This bill, however, was a compromise that only restricted oilfield brine releases during 
rice growing season. Despite the compromise, the bill had teeth. In 1912, the state took action 
against an oilfield operator whose brines had destroyed rice crops (Colten 2000). In 1924, the 
legislature passed another bill that prohibited large releases of brine year-round (State of 
Louisiana 1924). Thus, for most Southern states, natural resource protection was a priority, and 
they gave wildlife and fisheries departments authority over pollution monitoring. In Louisiana, 
this responsibility fell on the Department of Conservation (soon renamed the Department of 
Wild Life and Fisheries), that would later become a participating member in a new Stream 
Control Commission. In Texas, the administration gave the Game, Fish, and Oyster Commission 
authority to enforce pollution law. State regulations forbid pollution of surface waters as a 
whole; consequently, these agencies had to shift their focus quickly from conservation to 
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environmental protection, as they now also had to protect populations of non-game species 
(Colten 2001). Both the Louisiana and Texas departments, however, had found it difficult 
enough to fulfill their previous duties; now they also had to be the pollution police for the entire 
state. Chronically underfunded, they hastily turned to a more cooperative relationship with 
industry. In many cases, industrial groups even funded the investigations, which put the 
objectivity of the studies into doubt. 
 Thus, through the concentrated recruitment efforts of local and state governments, 
industry began moving to the South in the early twentieth century. However, progress was not as 
sweeping as it seemed, as most of the industries recruited paid low wages and brought little 
social change to the region. It took the Second World War and massive federal investment to 
bring in fast-growing, high-wage industries to the South. While the South did not receive as 
much investment as other regions, federal dollars had a greater influence on the mostly rural 
South, accelerating the forces of modernization and urbanization. With this growth, though, 
came industrial and municipal pollution issues, which state government only addressed in a 
piecemeal fashion in cooperation with industry. The South thus gained a reputation of having 
sold its environmental soul to the Devil in exchange for industrial progress. Upon examination, 
this mantra proves to be a myth, or at least an oversimplified generalization, for two reasons. 
Pollution regulations (or the lack thereof) were actually not a factor in industrial location 
decisions, and there was a history of objection to industrial pollution at the citizen and parish 
level. Additionally, Southern objections to pollution were fundamentally different from 
traditional manufacturing areas in the North, in that they focused on natural resources instead of 
public health (Colten 2006). 
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Chapter 4 
Waste Disposal in the Petroleum Industry 
 
Petroleum Industry Pollution  
 The industrial wastes, especially from the petroleum and petrochemical industries, that 
began affecting Southern states offered a much different and much larger problem than normal 
municipal waste. These industries use large amounts of water for cooling, processing, and waste 
removal, much more so than a normal city would require. They are typically located along a 
river, stream, or other watercourse to take advantage of the constant source of water. However, 
taking in and using this much water from a stream or river means that the same amount of water 
much be discharged to that same watercourse, usually carrying waste products. Sometimes the 
water picks up pollutants and waste simply through contact during processing, and sometimes 
refinery operators use the force of the water discharge stream to remove waste products, much 
like flushing a toilet. Industrial companies typically relied on the force of this water to dilute 
their wastes, and hopefully not cause any environmental or health problems. Because of the 
massive needs of industrial complexes and their large amounts of effluent, by 1974 water-using 
industry in the United States created three to four times as much waste as the sewered 
population. Half of this came from four major industries: paper, steel, organic chemical 
(including petrochemical), and petroleum (Berry & Horton 1974).  
 The multiple types of waste discharged by the petroleum industry presented their own 
unique set of waste disposal problems. Weston et al. (1953) list the various types of waste 
produced by this industry in their book Waste Disposal Problems of the Petroleum Industry. This 
book also reviews what activities produce each type of waste and how industry or municipalities 
can deal with the wastes.  
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 The first type of waste listed is free oil. Simply, this is crude oil or oil distillates, which 
leak from pipes or valves. Leaks and spills usually occur during transfer from one transport 
method to another, such as from pipes to truck or barges. They can also occur during routine 
maintenance. Gravity separators and skimmers can remove the floating oil from the surface of 
the water. Emulsions are another type of oily waste produced by the petroleum industry. They 
are more difficult to remove because they do not float on top of they water; they are distributed 
throughout the bulk of the water stream. They can develop in waste pipes and sewers when close 
contact occurs between water, oil, and some emulsifying agent. Because the emulsified oil does 
not float on top of the effluent stream, skimmers and gravity separators will not catch it, and it 
will flow with the rest of the stream to the release point. If an emulsion reaches a water body, 
however, turbidity and dilution will cause the emulsion to break and the oil to rise to the surface. 
Thus, free oil that was not immediately apparent in the waste stream can appear in the water 
body receiving the effluent.  
 One treatment involves caustics or organic chemicals. These can change the pH of the 
water, thus breaking the emulsions and causing the oil to float to the top where skimmers can 
remove them. Other special chemicals such as phenols, creosols, and methanols, can also cause 
problems if released into the environment. This category of petroleum wastes can emulsify oil or 
increase the biological oxygen demand in the water body. Their effects are usually severe 
enough to justify attempts at recovery and re-use. Acidic wastes, another common petroleum 
industry by-product, usually come from the sulfuric acid used as a treating agent and catalyst. 
The acid sludge left over after use of the sulfuric acid can actually be re-used a few times before 
disposal is necessary. The use of many different products, chemicals, and materials in the 
petroleum industry result in leftover sludges and solids. These sludges and solids comprise 
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another category of industrial wastes, and industrial companies must deal with them in a special 
way. They usually accumulate at the bottom of tanks and cooling towers, and industry cannot 
release them into sewers or waterways due to their high concentration of the offensive material. 
When sludges and solids are removed, any usable oil is extracted from them, and they are 
subsequently buried or burned.  
 Water used in the petroleum industry can also become a pollution hazard. Actually, water 
used for cooling is what makes up most of the waste stream, and it can easily become 
contaminated with oil during cooling processes or with the introduction of other wastes to the 
sewer system. Water used for washing of oils, tanks, vessels, and towers can obtain a severely 
alkaline pH. To avoid disturbing the pH of the water body receiving the waste stream, these 
alkaline waters can be stored in tanks or ponds and slowly released into the waste stream. Water 
used for the removal of human waste at the plant can also cause problems. It cannot be recovered 
and re-used, so must be discharged to the sewers. If released to the same sewers as the rest of the 
refinery wastes, however, it can interfere with the separation of oily wastes from the waste 
stream. Ideally, industrial companies should release it to a different, separate sewer system from 
the one that carries the refinery wastes, but the construction of two separate sewer systems can 
be a costly endeavor.  
Pollution Parameters 
 With so many different types of pollution coming from so many different sources, 
scientists and officials usually have a difficult time discovering which offensive material is 
causing problems, much less finding the guilty party. The multitudes of pollutants, along with 
their interactions with the water and organic materials in the river or stream, create infinite 
variations and variables that make it difficult to quantify exact amounts of pollutants. In addition, 
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before 1940 there was no good system for classifying wastes. Investigators would sometimes 
simply classify them (in very generic terms) by their effect on the waterway, noting whether 
wastes impeded filtration, increased bacterial content, affected taste and odor, or reduced water 
quality (Melosi 2000). In these early years, scientific analysis of polluted waters consisted only 
of simple measures of terms of hardness, turbidity, color, and presence of certain minerals and 
chemical such as salt, chlorine, and sodium chloride (Tarr 1985). Over the years, scientists 
discovered more measures that could provide a common yardstick of quantifiable variables 
related to industrial water pollution. These parameters offered some clues to the type of wastes 
present. A pH measurement, for example, can offer indications of the presence of acidic or 
alkaline wastes, along with their level of concentration and toxicity. Acidic readings can indicate 
presence of strong acids used by industry for the dissociation of organic and inorganic 
compounds. Alkaline readings usually come from spent caustics containing sodium, calcium, and 
potassium salts. Once these caustics have lost all of their strength, industry generally discards 
them as effluent. Another measure is the amount of solids present in the water. These solids can 
be organic or inorganic, and dissolved or suspended in the water stream. Dissolved organics 
cause the most problems, as they can create odd colors, odors, and tastes even at low 
concentrations. Another analysis method measures surface-active property, which is the tendency 
of a material to concentrate along the surface of the water. When certain materials do this, it can 
reduce surface tension and result in the emulsification of dirty and oily materials. Temperature is 
also a simple measurement that can indicate the presence of industrial effluent. Even if no toxic 
or otherwise polluting materials are present, heat pollution can cause problems for aquatic 
species and for downstream cities and industries that are using the water. If people believe toxic 
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materials are in fact present, they can perform a bioassay test to determine the toxic effects on 
microorganisms (Department of Interior 1970).  
 The most significant category of both municipal and industrial pollutants, especially in 
the petroleum and petrochemical industries, is organic material. Municipal waste consists almost 
solely of biological organic wastes in the form of sewage. Industrial wastes include organic 
wastes if the industrial processes utilize natural materials. This is the case in both the petroleum 
and petrochemical industries, which both use petroleum, natural gas, and other natural resources 
as their primary materials. The parameter most often used to measure the amount of organic 
pollutants is oxygen demand. This measurement method has been in use since the beginning of 
the twentieth century; the Public Health Service concentrated on oxygen demand when surveying 
the Ohio River in 1913 (Tarr 1985). Whenever Lake Charles industry sent a waste disposal 
application to the Stream Control Commission, the oxygen demand of the wastes was usually the 
main topic. Oxygen demand is a measure of the amount of dissolved oxygen that would be 
required for bacteria to break down the amount of waste present in the water. Whenever industry 
or municipalities release organic wastes into water bodies, aerobic bacteria begin to break down 
the wastes. Because the bacteria produce harmless by-products, this is a process is likened to a 
natural “self-cleaning” of the water body. However, to do their work these bacteria require 
oxygen. If a large amount of organic waste is present, more bacteria will grow and will need 
more oxygen. If enough waste is present, the oxygen demand will be so high that the bacteria 
will use all of the dissolved oxygen. This leaves none for other organisms in the water, who 
suffocate. Fish kills are a commonly seen result of high oxygen demand and low oxygen supply 
(Berry & Horton 1974). Researchers have actually developed multiple measures of oxygen 
demand for determining the amount of organic wastes present in a water body. The oldest and 
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most common is Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD). This is the measure, as discussed above, of 
oxygen required for bacteria to break down wastes naturally. BOD is the basis of most historic 
and modern effluent quality standards. Scientists originally used BOD to measure the effect of 
sewage on water bodies. Once industrial wastes became a problem, researchers began to speak of 
the BOD of organic industrial wastes in terms of population equivalent (PE), which 
nonprofessionals could more easily understand. Population Equivalent is a measure that 
compares the BOD of industrial waste to that of municipal waste. Researchers can then describe 
industrial waste as having the same effect on a water body as a city of a certain population. Once 
the use of chemicals to break down wastes became common practice, researchers began to use 
Chemical Oxygen Demand as a measurement parameter. This is simply a measure of the oxygen 
required for the chemical oxidization of wastes (Department of Interior 1970).  
Effects of Pollution on Water 
 A large quantity of industrial waste can have many undesirable effects on a water body. 
The first, and most obvious, effects are aesthetic. Some of these are visible, such as foam on the 
water's surface. Oily wastes create a visible iridescent sheen on the surface. Wastes from 
synthetic rubber manufacturing can include bits of rubber that float on the surface. One of the 
most offensive aesthetic effects, however, is odor cause by anaerobic decomposition 
(Department of Interior 1970). Once the biological oxygen demand is high enough, and oxygen 
levels low enough, aerobic bacteria cannot function. Anaerobic bacteria do not require oxygen 
for decomposition, and thrive in environments such as this. They begin breaking down the 
organic wastes, along with the remains of aquatic organisms killed by the lack of oxygen. Unlike 
aerobic bacteria, which produce harmless by-products, anaerobic bacteria emit objectionable 
substances such as methane and hydrogen sulfide (Berry & Horton 1974). Hydrogen sulfide is 
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one of the most common culprits in complaints about taste. The organic chemicals themselves 
also cause taste problems. Phenols usually cause the most issues. When municipalities chlorinate 
water containing phenols for domestic consumption, the process creates dichlorophenols, which 
give the water a medicinal taste. This can occur even if the phenols are present is amounts as 
small as one part per billion. Other chemicals, such as chlorinated hydrocarbons, organic acids, 
and sulfides, can cause taste problems. Taste problems are not limited to just the water; industrial 
wastes can also cause odd or oily tastes in fish, making a water body useless for commercial or 
recreational fishing. 
 There are also many biological effects of industrial waste. A high biological oxygen 
demand causes an oxygen deficit, which is deadly for all sorts of aquatic organisms and 
microorganisms. A change in environmental conditions and microbial populations such as this 
favors one group of organisms over another and can significantly alter food chain and 
reproductive patterns. Water temperature can multiply the effects of a high BOD. If the water 
temperature is high, this not only inhibits oxygen transfer, but also increases the rate of bacterial 
action (Department of Interior 1970). This can mean that streams with a high water temperature 
can recover from light pollution loads more quickly. Heavy pollution loads, however, have a 
more pronounced effect on water bodies with warm temperatures, as they run out of oxygen and 
move into anaerobic decomposition more quickly. These elevated water temperatures are 
commonly present in warm summer months. The temperature can be elevated year-round, 
however, if industry is releasing water that they have heated during processing (Berry & Horton 
1974). 
 Industrial waste can also have direct toxic effects on organisms. Some fish kills are 
caused not be a lack of oxygen, but simply by too high a concentration of toxic materials. When 
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present in drinking water, these materials can also be toxic to land-borne animals and humans, 
with high enough concentrations causing acute health problems. Usually though, health problems 
are chronic, caused by long-term, low-dose exposure. These problems most commonly appear as 
cancer in humans. Polluted water, if used for irrigation, can also ruin crops. Sodium, present in 
industrial caustics, can affect agriculture by reducing soil permeability.  If authorities suspect 
problems due to polluted water, they can use fish to measure the toxicity of the water. Fish are 
easy to use and control in a laboratory setting, and have a valid, quick, and easily observable 
response to water-borne toxins.  
 All of these negative effects can ruin a water body’s usefulness to society. Residents can 
use waterways and water bodies as recreation sites, for activities such as swimming and fishing. 
These activities are important to the locals, and bring in outside money when people travel to use 
the area for recreation. Polluted waterways can also affect residential land development, as the 
highest land and home values are usually near water. If the water is a health threat or has 
offensive aesthetic qualities, land values nearby will drop. Contaminated waterways can also 
become a hindrance to navigation. Oily wastes floating on the water present a fire hazard, and 
acidic wastes can prove corrosive to metal ship hulls. In addition, polluted waterways can have a 
detrimental effect on industry. If too much industrial effluent in present in the water, it cannot be 
used as a source for cooling and processing. Thus, unchecked waste disposal can come back to 
haunt industrial companies by eventually reducing their plant efficiency and ability to operate 
(U.S. Department of Interior 1970). 
Industrial Waste Treatment in the Early Twentieth Century  
 E.F. Eldridge’s (1942) book Industrial Waste Treatment Practice offers a glimpse into 
industrial waste treatment practices in the first half of the twentieth century. He published the 
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book in 1942, a time when the expansion of the petroleum industry was in full swing. Eldridge 
divides industrial wastes into two main groups: those that industry can utilize, and those that 
require treatment. Industrial wastes requiring treatment are usually liquids that carry diluted or 
emulsified wastes. There is no easy way to extract the wastes for reuse, so they must be disposed 
of. However, if the concentration or toxicity is too high, treatment is first required. This category 
of wastes includes organic wastes, toxic wastes such as phenols, and inert wastes such as refinery 
oils and tars.  
 The treatment of these wastes falls into six categories: disposal by dilution, disposal by 
irrigation, primary treatment, chemical treatment, secondary treatment, and chlorination. 
Disposal by dilution consists of simply trying to lessen the waste’s impact on the receiving 
waterway by releasing it with large amounts of water. Disposal by irrigation is a similar method, 
but instead of using the “natural forces of purification available in water,” it uses the “same 
forces available in the soil” (Eldridge 1942: 39). Workers spread the waste across a cultivated 
field, where filtration, biological action, and oxidization serve as natural treatment methods. For 
effective treatment, the soils must have a high permeability and be cultivated often to keep the 
natural forces operating. Eldridge states that sometimes crops are cultivated in the fields, but 
“this practice is not generally looked upon with favor by health authorities” (Eldridge 1942: 42). 
 Primary treatment involves the physical removal of wastes from the wastewater stream. 
Screening and sedimentation are two methods used to remove the waste in this way. Screens 
filter out large debris, and a sedimentation tank allows suspended solids to settle out of the waste 
stream, leaving sludge at the bottom of the tank. These processes remove approximately 60 
percent of solids, but only 24 to 40 percent of the wastes with high oxygen demands (Douglas 
1983). In 1930, the API published a recommended design for an oil-water separator, and this 
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quickly became the most common method refineries used to prevent oily wastes from entering a 
receiving stream (API 1990). Both of the major oil refineries in Lake Charles (Continental and 
Cities Service) reported using oil-water separators of API design, as well as settling tanks to 
remove any solids in the waste stream (Roy 1944; Flood 1941). 
Removal, however, only concentrates the waste; it still must be disposed of. Incineration 
is the most frequently used method, although this simply shifts the disposal medium from the 
water to the air. Engineers did not develop chemical treatment fully until the 1940s, when 
cheaper chemicals, better equipment, and more sophisticated methods made it feasible. One of 
the main chemical treatment methods is coagulation or flocculation. When solids in suspension 
in the wastewater stream are too light to settle on their own for sedimentation or screening, waste 
engineers must use this method. Chemicals added to the water force the solids to coagulate and 
settle, allowing for their removal. Chemical treatment also bridges the gap between primary and 
secondary treatment methods. If too much waste is present for primary treatment to be effective, 
but not enough is present to justify the costs of secondary treatment, the more inexpensive 
chemical methods are used.  
 Secondary treatment consists of a few different methods. Biological filtration is similar to 
the screening methods of primary treatments. However, filters only remove the coarsest particles; 
biological action is responsible for the majority of waste disposal. Bacteria act on the wastes 
much as they do in the natural self-cleaning process of a waterway. In this setting, however, their 
action is more efficient and operates on a smaller time scale (Eldridge 1942). Activated sludge is 
another secondary treatment method that is much more precise. Plant operators mix bacterial 
organisms with settled waste sludge. They then aerate the sludge with mechanical agitators and 
allow it to settle again, creating an even larger sludge. The operators repeat this process 
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frequently to create an activated sludge, which they then use to purify incoming wastes (Douglas 
1983). Biochemical treatment is a secondary treatment developed in the 1940s. It is an offshoot 
of the activated sludge method, but with the addition of chemicals. Waste engineers add ferric 
chloride or ferric sulphate to the mixture to trigger coagulation. This speeds up the breakdown of 
the wastes and results in a much more efficient treatment. Another waste treatment method using 
chemicals is chlorination. The addition of chlorine to the waste stream not only reduces the 
biological oxygen demand, but also reduces corrosion of the treatment equipment, sterilizes the 
waste stream, and controls odors and flies. However, if phenols are present in the waste stream, 
chlorination can cause problems. Chlorinated phenols can cause distinct, offensive odors and 
tastes in the waste stream. If the waste is released to a waterway with a downstream municipal 
water intake, the population will notice the unpleasant taste and odor at concentrations as low as 
0.02 parts per million. Other chemicals used in refinery processes, such as mercaptans and 
sulphides, can also cause taste and odor problems at low concentrations. Ethyl mercaptan can 
produce a foul taste at a concentration as low as one part per fifty billion (Eldridge 1942). 
 Industry generates wastes that require these complex treatment methods through equally 
complex processing methods. Almost from the moment the crude oil enters the refinery, plant 
processes are producing wastes. The first step in refining is to wash the crude oil with water to 
remove any brine left over from the drilling process. The refinery releases this water, now 
carrying a high concentration of salt, into the sewer system for disposal. Brine alone, even 
without any oily wastes, can ruin irrigated crops and drinking water, kill fish and wildlife 
populations, and cause corrosion on any metal structures in the water. After washing, the crude 
oil flows to fractionation towers, where processes extract five fractions: gasoline, kerosene, 
distillate, gas-oil, and residue. Refineries process the first three further to remove excess 
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materials such as hydrogen sulphates, mercaptans, and gums. These materials join the waste 
stream for disposal. The residue travels to a fractionating chamber, where it is “cracked.” 
Cracking is a method using either heat and pressure or a chemical catalyst to break down 
molecules and extract different lighter products from heavy products such as fuel oil and crude 
oil residue. The residue passes through the chamber, which extracts gasoline, light oils, and 
heavy oils. The oils pass through again, which extracts even more gasoline. This gasoline is 
treated with caustic soda, and sometimes also with sulfuric acid. The acid sludge and spent 
caustic left over from this process flow to the sewer. These acid sludges were the most serious 
waste disposal problem for refineries in the 1930s; the API estimated that refineries released 
55,000 to 110,000 tons of acid sludges in 1932 alone (API 1990). The fraction stream continued 
through the refinery, and sodium plumbate is added in what is known as the doctor treatment, 
which removes sulphides and mercaptans. Workers then release the spent doctor and sludges to 
the sewer. Some refineries, however, avoid this waste problem by substituting a copper chloride 
filtration process, which results in much less waste. The final treatment for all gasolines 
recovered in the refinery is a washing with water, which subsequently flows into the sewer 
(Eldridge 1942). Thus, almost every step in the refining process results in some form of waste, 
most of which are released into water bodies for disposal. 
 Even though information about refinery operation and technology was widely distributed 
and well known, information on how much waste refineries generated was very hard to come by 
in the early twentieth century. The U.S. Public Health Service estimated that for every barrel 
(forty-two gallons) of crude oil processed, the petroleum industry generated one thousand 
gallons of waste. They estimated that, because 80 to 90 percent of this waste was unpolluted 
cooling water, 100 to 200 gallons of the per-barrel waste stream was polluted effluent. In an 
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unpublished report of the Michigan Stream Control Commission, one Michigan refinery 
produced about 68 gallons of waste per barrel of crude oil. Table 1 shows that the vast majority 
of this waste stream consists of wash water from the gasoline. This water has a very low phenol 
content in parts per million. However, because the quantity released is so large, this wash water 
is the source of the bulk of the phenols released at this location. In this instance, a seemingly 
harmless proportion of pollutants actually become a problem because of the quantity produced.  
Table 1. Phenol Content of Refinery Wastes 
 
 
       (Source: Eldridge 1942: 341) 
 
Another significant problem in waste management during this time was that the wastewater 
stream was continuous, but the spent caustics, acids, sludges, and other solutions entered the 
stream in batches. This prevented the safe dilution and distribution of harmful effluent in the 
waterway, and increased the toxicity, biological oxygen demand, and other harmful effects of the 
waste stream (Eldridge 1942).  
Municipal vs. Industrial Waste Management 
 Waste management practices (for all types of waste), have consistently revolved around 
one issue: where to dispose of waste. This question predated any questions of the makeup of 
Phenol Content  
Waste Source 
 
Volume 
gal. per 
1,000 bbl. 
Parts 
per 
million 
Lbs per 
1,000 
bbl. 
Percentage 
of total 
Desalting 4,000 4 0.13 0.5
Spent caustic (skimming) 35 1,500 0.44 1.7
Spent doctor (skimming) 35 2,500 0.73 2.8
Spent caustic (cracking) 150
Condensate of raw-
gasoline condenser 
1,300 2 0.02 0.1
Wash water from gasoline 59,000 50 24.60 93.0
Wash water from agitators 4,000 15 0.50 1.9
Total 68,520 26.42 100.0
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waste or of possible treatment practices, and over the years, cities and industry have made 
multiple shifts in the medium, or “sink,” that they use for disposal (Tarr 1996). Municipalities 
disposed of wastes on land until the early twentieth century, when there was a shift to using 
water as a sink. This shift relied on the commonly held idea that running water would purify 
itself (Tarr 1996). Dumping to running water at least provided a type of “out of sight, out of 
mind” solution. As long as a city’s water intake was upstream from its waste disposal point, the 
populace had no reason to worry. Of course, the waste became a problem for cities located 
downstream. By the mid-twentieth century, water-borne municipal waste had become such a 
contentious issue between cities that another sink shift occurred, and some cities began disposing 
of their waste on land again (Tarr 1996). For industrial wastes, however, the sequence of sink 
shifts was not so clear-cut. Industry alternately used land, air, and water as a sink throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Efforts to restrict industrial water disposal, however, began in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Some industries shifted to a land sink as a result, but most continued to 
dispose of their wastes in waterways (Colten 2004). A water sink offered the most efficient way 
to quickly dilute and dispose of the massive amount of wastes that industrial plants were capable 
of producing. 
 Municipal and industrial wastes management also differed on the issue of treatment. Prior 
to 1920, treatment of industrial wastes was not a major issue. Many people believed these wastes 
only constituted an indirect threat because they would impair a stream’s ability to oxidize and 
purify municipal sewage (Tarr 1985). By 1942, E.F. Eldridge reports that municipalities had 
made rapid progress in sewage treatment, but industry had made almost no progress in the 
treatment of industrial wastes. At that time, The U.S. Public Health Service reported that 
industrial pollution was equal to the amount of pollution generated by the entire U.S. population. 
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In many cases, wastes generated by the industrial sector of a city far exceeded the amount of 
sewage generated by the city. Specific treatment for these industrial wastes was not a priority. In 
many cities, if industrial wastes received any treatment, industry simply sent them through the 
municipal waste treatment systems. For some cities, industry generated so much waste that it was 
the primary focus of the municipal treatment facility (Eldridge 1942). However, engineers 
designed these treatment facilities to deal with municipal sewage, not industrial wastes. Thus, 
these treatment processes were not optimal for the more noxious and toxic industrial wastes.  
 Surveys by the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) in the 1950s give us some of the 
actual numbers related to municipal and industrial waste. In 1951, the USPHS reported that more 
than 22,000 sources of pollution existed in the United States. This included 11,800 municipal 
sources and 10,400 industrial sources. Despite 9,300 treatment plants working to treat these 
wastes, the Public Health Service estimated that industrial and municipal wastes released in the 
nation’s waterways were the equivalent of raw sewage from 150 million people. It also estimated 
that 6,600 municipal sources and 3,500 industrial sources required either a new treatment plant 
or addition to an existing one. It listed seven thousand other needs as unascertained, with the 
majority of these listed as industrial (USPHS 1951b).  
 Lack of data on industrial waste would become a common theme in the Public Health 
Service reports. In fact, the 1951 report stated that the full impact of industrial pollution was not 
yet determined. Of the 10,400 industrial waste sources listed, only 6,000 produced organic 
wastes that were measurable by domestic sewage standards. Of those, detailed information on 
only 2,000 was available. Of the remaining 4,400 industrial waste sources, 2,400 discharged 
inorganic wastes that were not quantifiable in terms of population equivalent, and 2,000 simply 
did not report on their waste discharges. As a result, The Public Health Service only had concrete 
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numbers on the effect of waste discharges for one-fifth of American industry (USPHS 1951b). 
While the USPHS was not able to get much information on the actual pollution load, they were 
able to find information on who was treating their pollution and who was not. The information 
they did receive was not very comforting, as only 2,595 of the industrial waste sources were 
treating their waste. Four thousand more did not give out any information about whether they 
were treating or not. Of the industries with treatment, the USPHS reported that under half of the 
plants had adequate operational capacity and satisfactory operations (USPHS 1951b). 
 Most of the gaps in industrial effluent data came from Southern states, and most of the 
treatment plants for industrial waste were located in the Northeast/Midwest industrial zone 
(USPHS 1951b). A USPHS report on drainage basins in the Southwest and Lower Mississippi 
River regions confesses that the data have wide gaps and are inadequate for discovering the 
scope of basin-wide pollution issues. The USPHS was hopeful, however, that the data would be 
sufficient for instituting local corrective measures (USPHS 1951a). The report blames the 
general confusion and lack of treatment facilities partly on war priorities during industrialization: 
"during World War II, activities in the field of pollution abatement suffered considerable setback 
due to the necessity for diverting material to the war effort” (USPHS 1951a: ix). There had been 
some post-war progress, with eight industrial treatment plants built between 1946 and 1950. 
However, the report lamented slow action on needed projects, and stated that pollution 
abatement was still lagging far behind pollution. The blame fell on Southern state governments 
for “...lack of state agency action, inadequate legislative authority, limited technical staffs, and 
insufficient funds for the administration of aggressive pollution control” (USPHS 1951a: xii). In 
fact, the purpose of this report was to advocate for a focus on river basins and interstate compacts 
rather than individual state legislation, especially in the South.  
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Waste Disposal in Lake Charles  
 The data on waste streams in Lake Charles is perhaps some of the worst in the USPHS 
reports. What we do know is that in Lake Charles, both municipalities and industry used the 
Calcasieu River basin as their sink. With a drainage basin encompassing 4,100 square miles, the 
Calcasieu drains a good portion of southwestern Louisiana. The river is 215 miles long, with 
multiple tributaries such as Whiskey Chitto Creek, Barnes Creek, West Fork, Bayou D’Inde, and 
Bayou Verdine. The city of Lake Charles sits forty-five miles from the mouth of the river, and 
the river is navigable up to ninety-seven miles from its mouth. The area receives an average of 
sixty inches of rainfall a year, but during the late summer and early fall rainfall can be much 
lower. During these times, the flow of the river can be as low as a few hundred cubic feet per 
second. Closer to the Gulf, tidal action affects the river during these low-flow periods, and the 
river flows backwards during high tides. This often-miniscule flow is not the best for dilution of 
wastes; municipal or industrial. Table 2 presents stream flow data for the study period at Kinder, 
Louisiana. Kinder is about 30 miles upriver from Lake Charles, and is the closest place with 
detailed historical stream flow data covering the years of industrialization. Refineries in the area 
used substantial amounts of water for processing and cooling, and discharged this water back to 
the river. Even if the discharge was free of oily wastes and toxins, the water temperature was 
much higher and the oxygen level much lower. Once the Calcasieu began flowing backwards on 
an incoming tide, Lake Charles refineries inadvertently took in the same water they had just 
discharged downstream. After a few rounds of this, the water in the Calcasieu was completely 
devoid of oxygen. Add municipal and industrial wastes that further reduced dissolved oxygen 
levels, and fish kills often occurred. Table 2 shows that every year had periods in which the 
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stream flow in the Calcasieu was very low. In addition, some years, such as 1942-4, 1948, 1951-
2, 1954, and 1956 had low average flow for the entire year. 
Table 2. 
Daily Stream Flow Data by Year, Kinder, LA 
 
Year Mean Daily 
Stream Flow 
Maximum Daily 
Stream Flow 
Minimum Daily 
Stream Flow 
1940 2,914 60,800 278 
1941 4,575 31,700 446 
1942 1,750 19,400 477 
1943 1,070 8,680 248 
1944 1,542 20,200 280 
1945 3,100 27,600 359 
1946 4,145 28,500 468 
1947 3,221 35,600 265 
1948 1,788 10,900 201 
1949 3,822 30,900 262 
1950 3,972 43,000 413 
1951 1,322 9,500 168 
1952 1,968 29,600 284 
1953 4,589 166,000 248 
1954 1,470 46,500 192 
1955 2,609 38,600 213 
1956 1,463 15,200 140 
1957 2,098 23,600 170 
 
 *All figures are in cubic feet per second 
         (Source: Slack 1993)   
     
 Unfortunately, the only solid information the USPHS reports have on wastes being 
released to the Calcasieu deals with municipal waste. The 1951 report listed only six major 
sources of municipal waste in the Calcasieu basin. These sewage systems served a population of 
just over 70,000 people. Only five of the municipalities had adequate treatment plants, but this 
covered 90 percent of the population served. For 1957, the USPHS released another, more 
detailed report, this time an itemized inventory of municipal and industrial waste facilities across 
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the country (USPHS 1958). This report listed twelve sources of municipal waste in the Calcasieu 
River Basin, but information was not complete for all of the listings (Table 3).  
 Table 3. 
Municipal Waste Sources in the Calcasieu River Basin, 1968 
 
 
Waste Source 
 
Population 
Served 
 
Treatment 
(Type) 
Population 
Equivalent 
(After 
Treatment) 
 
Downstream Uses of 
Water 
Calcasieu parish 
Sewer District #1 
ND Yes (ND) ND ND 
Leesville-Camp 
Polk 
 Yes (secondary) ND Livestock water, fishing, 
wildlife, navigation 
DeRidder 5,000 Yes (ND) 1,000 Livestock water, fishing, 
wildlife, navigation 
Oakdale 5,500 Yes (secondary) 1,650 Domestic supply, 
industrial supply, 
livestock water, 
irrigation, fishing, 
wildlife, navigation 
DeQuincy 3,200 Yes (primary) ND ND 
Westlake 3,000 Yes (secondary) 900 ND 
Sulphur 5,000 Yes (secondary) ND ND 
Maplewood 3,800 Yes (secondary) 600* ND 
Greenwich 
Terrace 
3,500* Yes (primary) 600* ND 
Lake Charles Air 
Force Base 
1,920 Yes (secondary) 575 ND 
Lake Charles 
Plant A1
35,0001 Yes (secondary) ND1 Irrigation, fishing, 
navigation 
Lake Charles 
Plant B 
15,000 Yes (secondary) 3,000 Irrigation, fishing, 
navigation 
ND = No Data 
* – 1951 data 
1  – 1951 data for Lake Charles Plant A shows a population served of 53,000, with a treated PE of 5,000.  Lake 
Charles Plant B was built after 1951, and the waste load split between Plant A and Plant B. 
(Source: USPHS 1958, 1951) 
  
 For industry in the area, the data is in pieces. However, it allows us to get a partial idea of 
what type and amount of wastes industry was releasing. The 1951 USPHS Drainage Basin 
  69
Report states that eleven industrial pollution sources existed in the Calcasieu basin. It does not 
give the companies’ names, simply the type of wastes produced. Note that due to the diversity of 
processes and products and any one plant, multiple types of waste can come from any one waste 
source.  Of these eleven sources, nine produced organic wastes, but a population equivalent (of 
440,000) was only available for one of the plants. Five plants produced inorganic wastes and one 
had wastes of an undetermined type. Of the eleven waste sources, three had treatment plants with 
satisfactory treatment, one was in need of a new plant, two were in need of additions to existing 
plants, and five had undetermined needs. Through these treatment plant data, we discover that 
the plants in need of additions were a chemical products plant that discharged 7,000 gallons per 
minute (gpm) of wastewater, and the other, with the previously mentioned population equivalent 
of 440,000, was a petroleum refinery. The report lists the plant that required no treatment under 
the category of paper and allied products. The plants whose needs were undetermined include a 
lumber production business, two chemical products plants, an oil production operation that 
extracts 3,600 barrels (bbl) per day, and a petroleum products plant that uses 10,000 barrels of 
crude per day. Using these limited numbers to discover the types and amounts of wastes 
discharged into the Calcasieu is difficult. Data was not available for many plants, and plants that 
submitted data did so anonymously and in multiple, differing formats (gpm, PE, bbl/day).   
 This problem continued in the USPHS’s 1957 waste facility inventory. The report listed 
only fourteen facilities as releasing their waste to the Calcasieu River or one of its tributaries. 
Twelve of these were the municipal facilities listed in Table 3. The other two waste sources were 
industrial companies, but data is limited. The first is Lake Charles Petroleum Chemicals, Inc., 
which only offered that its waste flowed to Bayou d’Inde, and that it was treated. The company 
reported that it had a waste treatment plant designed to handle a maximum of 100,000 gallons 
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per day with a PE of 1,000, but offered no data on actual waste discharge or treatment. The 
second company listed was the massive Cities Service Refinery. It offered no data except that its 
waste flowed to the Calcasieu River, and that it was treated. In addition, company officials may 
have only been reporting the human waste the plant produced, as they only listed a simple septic 
tank as their treatment method for their waste. None of the other plants known to be operating 
and discharging waste into the Calcasieu River Basin gave their information to the inventory. In 
fact, this seemed to be a statewide problem. Only nine industries reported information for the 
inventory in Louisiana, making Louisiana’s section of the report only five pages long. For the 
few industries that did report, they gave only estimations of their waste’s population equivalent. 
In contrast, Arkansas took up twenty-six pages of the inventory, listing many dozens of industrial 
sites. The listings gave detailed information and spanned different industries, with information 
from petroleum production, refining, meatpacking, canning, and other food industries (USPHS 
1958).  
 It is hard to know who to blame for the lack of information about Louisiana industry. We 
know that the USPHS reports, at least, were cooperative efforts between federal and state 
officials. For the 1957 inventory, the USPHS stated, “the active cooperation of the state water 
pollution control agencies in collecting these data is gratefully acknowledged” (USPHS 1958: 
iii). Either the SCC is to blame for not collecting the data, or industry is blame for refusing to 
provide it. Unfortunately, I found no mention of the inventory in SCC records. These records 
also do not offer much direct information on the amounts of waste disposal in the Calcasieu 
basin. To begin with, records of the SCC meetings are sparse through much of the 1940s. When 
SCC members mention Calcasieu waste disposal applications in meeting minutes, many times 
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they do not discuss exact amounts of waste. For the most part, the actual applications with these 
data are missing.  
 It is possible to glean some hard data about waste disposal from the SCC’s meeting 
minutes and correspondence. I will convert all measures into cubic feet per second (cfs) for 
comparison with stream flow data. The first hard data available from the SCC is from 1948, 
involving the Cities Service refinery. In a letter to the refinery’s manager, the chairman of the 
SCC reports on wastewater samples taken at the plant. The SCC’s calculations show that at the 
time, Cities Service was releasing 470 cubic feet per second of waste with high BOD (12 parts 
per million). The SCC chair explained that this much waste could easily cause a problem, 
especially in the summer when stream flow can be as low as 600 cubic feet per second.  The 
SCC records also offer information about the wastes of the Mathieson Chemical Corporation 
In 1954, Mathieson sent forms to the SCC detailing all of the wastes released to the Calcasieu. 
This was not an application for new waste disposal, but rather a statement of wastes sent “in 
accordance with [a] request…” from “some time ago” (Nevell 1954). The list of wastes is shown 
in Table 4. Mathieson discharged the wastes in three groups. The wastes from Group A flowed to 
impounding reservoirs to cool the wastes and settle out some solids. They then flowed out to the 
Calcasieu River, but only during the months of October through February. This was done to 
avoid disrupting rice irrigation, which occurs during the spring and summer months. The wastes 
in Group B experienced a high degree of dilution because of the large amount of cooling water 
that was part of the group. They then flowed to the Calcasieu River through a private ship slip 
owned by the company. Sixty thousand gallons per hour (2.23 cfs) of cooling water diluted the 
wastes from Group C. Some of these wastes caused a reaction that pulled some solids out of 
solution. Mathieson diverted the waste stream to a swamp where the solids settled out of the  
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Table 4. 
Wastes Discharged by Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 1954 
 
Group Type Temperature Content Added Flow 
(GPH) 
Flow 
(CFS) 
Soda Ash 
Processing 
200 F Dissolved/suspended 
solids; chlorides 
92,000 
GPH 
3.41 
Shell washing Ambient Silt; Calcium carbonates; 
dissolved/suspended 
solids 
90,000 3.34 
Boiler water  200 F Suspended solids; 
Calcium carbonates; 
chlorides; sulfates 
600 0.02 
 
 
 
A 
Brine purification ND Chlorides; calcium 
carbonate 
450-600 0.02 
Boiler blowdown 200 F Chlorides; dissolved 
solids; phosphates; silicon 
dioxide; sodium hydrogen 
sulfite; calcium carbonate 
5,400 0.20 
Service waters 
(floor washing, 
etc) 
Ambient Alkali; silt Unknow
n 
Unknow
n 
Boiler water 200 F Suspended/dissolved 
solids; chlorides; sulfates; 
calcium carbonate 
800 0.02 
Boiler blowdown 200 F Dissolved solids; calcium 
carbonate; chlorides; 
sulfates; phosphates; 
silicon dioxide; sodium 
sulfite 
2,230 0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
Condenser/heat 
exchanger cooling 
water 
10 to 60 above 
ambient 
None 5,000,00
0 
185.55 
Process clean-up Ambient Hydrazine; aniline 50 <0.01 
Lime kiln scrubber  104-122 F Suspended solids; 
Calcium carbonate 
300,000 11.13 
Cooling tower Ambient Suspended solids; calcium 
carbonate; chlorides; 
sulfates; phosphates; 
silicon dioxide 
200 <0.01 
 
 
 
C 
Cooling water Unknown None 60,000 2.23 
ND = No Data  
        (Source: Stream Control Commission 1954) 
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stream before the rest of the waste flowed to the Calcasieu River. Unfortunately, this report 
contains no data on the BOD or any other adverse effects of this waste on the receiving waters. 
However, if we remove the unpolluted cooling water, we see that Mathieson was discharging 
approximately 18.2 cubic feet per second of polluted effluent. 
 Additionally, we can use the estimate developed by the U.S. Public Health Service to 
calculate approximately the amount of wastes other companies in Lake Charles were producing. 
The USPHS estimated that for every barrel of crude oil processed, refineries produced one 
thousand gallons of waste. Because the vast majority of that was cooling water, only one 
hundred to two hundred gallons were actually polluted effluent. The Continental Oil Refinery 
was equipped to process 16,000 barrels per day (Flood 1941). Using the USPHS estimate, this 
refinery was producing anywhere from 1.6 million to 3.2 million gallons of polluted effluent per 
day. This is equal to 2.4-4.9 cubic feet per second of harmful waste. The Cities Service refinery 
in Lake Charles processed 70,000 barrels of crude per day when it first opened. Using the 
USPHS estimate, we can calculate that the refinery was probably dumping seven million to 
fourteen million gallons of waste per day. These figures are equivalent to 10.8-21.6 cubic feet 
per second of polluted effluent. 
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Chapter 5 
Reactions to Waste 
 
Legislative Attempts and the Rise of the API  
 People knew of the harmful qualities of industrial waste since the turn of the twentieth 
century; this was no surprise. As soon as the Gulf Coast oil boom began, people noticed the 
effects of oily wastes. Oil companies stored their finds in wooden tank and earthen pits which 
were vulnerable to leaks and spills. Companies also spilled oil when transferring it from storage 
to trucks or barges for transport. When kerosene and gasoline were the only valuable by-products 
of crude oil, many companies simply dumped the leftover product onto the ground or into rivers 
and lakes. Some plants even used this leftover crude as fuel to power their plants, even though 
burning it caused large amounts of air pollution (Cobb 1984). No one needed to measure this 
pollution in terms of biological oxygen demand or parts per billion; it was visible and offensive. 
Floating oil in harbors, rivers, and on beaches was responsible for killing fish, birds, oyster beds, 
and for floating fires. Knowledge of the problem even spread nationwide when the Hudson River 
caught fire in 1921; newspapers nationwide carried the story. 
 Around the time of the Hudson River fire, local and state governments were attempting to 
address the new pollution problems. A New Jersey congressman used the publicity of the event 
to gather support for a bill banning oily waste discharges. Congressmen around the country took 
the cue and began proposing multiple similar bills. All of this legislation, however, simply 
showed the inexperience of the congressmen in dealing with industrial waste issues. They did not 
realize that this complicated issue required more than simply banning oily wastes. The American 
Petroleum Institute, working in the interest of its members, quickly pointed out the vague and 
contradictory nature of many of the bills. For instance, the definition of oily wastes was not 
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clear-cut; no one knew the amount of oil in wastewater that would result in the categorization of 
effluent as oily waste. Refinery operators argued that it was impossible to eliminate all oil from 
wastewater. The API also noted that in many of the bills, it was illegal to dump oily wastes into a 
stream or river, but legal to dump directly to the municipal sewer system. This was regardless of 
whether municipalities had designed their system to handle and treat oily wastes (Gorman 2001).  
 Vague definitions and contradictions were only the beginning of the problems the 
government faced in this early stage of combating pollution. No government officials or agencies 
had any proper technical understanding of the long-term processes and consequences of oil 
pollution. No legal procedures were in place to regulate or punish offenders. In addition, no 
effective institutions existed to deal with the pollution problem. Jurisdiction, if extant, fell across 
many different agencies, few of which had the time or resources to spend on oil pollution. Many 
state government agencies (fish and game, public health, conservation, and harbor districts) 
addressed small portions of the problem, but none counted it a major responsibility. On the 
federal level the Army Corps of Engineers, the Public Health Service, the Bureau of Fisheries, 
and the Bureau of Mines all had limited jurisdiction over the problem. Like the state agencies, 
none saw it as one of their major functions. In typical “pass the buck” fashion, none of the 
agencies took the lead on the problem or helped to coordinate the others (Pratt 1980, Pratt 1978). 
This is not, however, to insinuate that government officials of the time were bumbling, 
incompetent idiots. In fact, as Joseph Pratt writes,  
Such problems were to be expected when a political structure inherited from a much 
simpler age attempted to respond to difficult problems brought about by the very large 
production of a relatively new product by corporations operating on a scale previously 
unknown to the region. (Pratt 1978: 9) 
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 Continued public outcry led to federal hearings in the early 1920s. Government leaders 
even joined in the call for regulation, but their ideas were rooted in a conservation ethic. They 
were upset at the wasted revenue caused by spilled oil that never made it to market. They also 
worried that, if wasteful practices continued, domestic oil supplies would run out in ten or fifteen 
years. However, it proved to be impossible to find a compromise between advocates of 
regulation and the petroleum industry. Regulation advocates still argued for a complete ban of 
oily wastes, eschewing any talk of measurements or levels of pollution. Legislators had already 
passed a ban on discharging oily wastes from ships, and these advocates argued that it was only 
fair and logical to ban wastes from the refineries at which the ships docked. The refiners 
continued to argue that it was impossible to eliminate oil completely from their wastewater. This 
standoff resulted in the Oil Pollution Act of 1924, a useless piece of legislation that only served 
to reinforce the ban on oily ballast discharges from ships. The act, seen as a victory for the oil 
industry, only forbade discharges from ships in coastal waters. It completely excluded land-based 
industrial plants, along with ships on navigable rivers and the Great Lakes (Pratt 1980, Gorman 
2001).  
 So began an era in which the oil industry dominated all discussions and knowledge of 
technical, pollution, and regulatory issues. The API became a powerful organization, and took a 
lead role in all of these discussions, once it realized it could control the flow of information 
(Melosi 2000). The organization funded oil companies’ research, along with participating in 
many “cooperative” studies with various government agencies. The government agencies usually 
played a minimal role in the studies due to their lack of technical knowledge. This deficit of 
expertise, plus a lack of funding, forced the agencies to work through the oil industry to find the 
causes and effects of pollution. However, the API held final editing control over the studies, 
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which resulted in a wealth of technical information, but little to no public policy changes (Pratt 
1980).  This was mostly because it was especially slow to research problems that could result in 
changes that members did not support. This selectiveness stifled creative research that could 
show the broader implications of pollution and help plan for the long-term growth of the 
industry. Confusion also erupted over which research companies should share, and which they 
should keep secret. Many companies did not want to lose their competitive edge by sharing all of 
their information with the API, and thus, the entire industry.  In 1924 (the same year as the Oil 
Pollution Act) the API published its first set of official industry standards, which they viewed 
this as the most useful way of disseminating all of the new information on manufacturing 
techniques. The standards focused on increasing useful products and reducing waste. These 
standards were based on what Hugh Gorman (2001) called the efficiency ethic. Efficiency ethic 
adherents held that pollution was merely a product of poorly designed industrial processes. They 
trusted that scientific advancements would eventually allow them to find uses for all of their 
current waste products. This would improve their economic efficiency and automatically reduce 
pollution loads, thus eliminating any need for federal or state regulation (Gorman 2001; Hays 
1959).  
 These standards, along with the continuing arguments with regulation advocates, helped 
to entrench the efficiency ethic as the primary strategy used to fend off complaints. The 
petroleum industry and the API argued that this strategy was justified, both economically and 
environmentally. They argued that, in line with conversation practices of the day, it would 
preclude the need for “costly, complicated legislation” (Gorman 2001: 22). In their view, 
pollution was simply the result of inefficient, poorly designed industrial processes. To improve 
the efficiency of the plant, engineers would need to design processes that would extract a greater 
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amount of usable products from the crude oil. The API argued that, since this would increase 
profit for the plants, this was something on which engineers were already working. Improving 
efficiency in the plants would also lead to a reduction in waste, and thus, less pollution. This 
normal business practice of attempting to increase profit was consequently, in the view of the oil 
industry, serving the public good along with functioning as a form of self-regulation. 
 The movement of the API into the waste disposal arena continued throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s. The Army Corps of Engineers issued a report stating that coastal water quality had 
improved since the passage of the 1924 Oil Pollution Act. However, the report also asserted that 
refinery pollution was still a problem, as it was interfering with the decomposition of municipal 
sewage and threatening fish and shellfish populations. The Corps suggested either recovery 
devices at refineries to reduce discharges, or a complete discharge ban (Gorman 2001). This 
report, along with resurrected legislation attempts, prompted a practical response from the API. 
Their technical committees put together a report claiming that 181 plants emitted no pollution at 
all. For ninety-three other plants that were polluting, the committees made recommendations for 
changes that would supposedly fix the problem. This “good-faith” promise, along with a great 
deal of behind-the-scenes political bargaining, resulted in the failure of the pending legislation. 
The technical committees promised to continue this policy of self-regulation by making frequent 
recommendations on waste disposal procedures to offending plants. Of course, giving the 
petroleum industry free rein on regulation meant that they could be as harsh or lax as they 
wanted. In addition, companies were only given recommendations; if the suggestions were not 
viewed to be cost-effective, they usually were not implemented (Gorman 2001). Legislators 
proposed another bill to ban oily discharges in 1930, and the API responded once again with 
self-regulation, by publishing a multi-volume manual on the disposal of refinery wastes. The 
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manual called for three pollution-reduction strategies: more efficient oil separators, better sewer 
design, and the recovery and reuse of spent chemicals. The API also discussed other measures of 
pollution besides oil concentration, such as biological oxygen demand, pH, color, turbidity, and 
taste-causing agents (API 1930). This was the first time any industry experts had come close to 
suggesting what would eventually become the backbone of environmental regulations: standard 
setting (Gorman 2001). However, the API stated that they believed it was impractical for the 
government to set standards, as every case should be considered separately. Their excuse was 
that one must consider the unique ways others utilized the receiving stream, along with the 
specific types of waste for each individual case (API 1930). This would become the backbone of 
the API’s argument against pollution regulations. 
Instead of worrying about standards, most operators simply attempted to keep discharges 
below the level at which they would become obvious to the public. This was easy to do if the 
effluent did not have taste-causing characteristics. However, the manual did not have much 
effect on waste management in the industry. Refinery operators saw the upgrades as a significant 
expense with not much return. By 1940, most refineries had not met the goals set out by the API, 
and many who achieved waste reduction did so by diluting their waste with more cooling water. 
They were releasing the same amount of waste, but they made it less noticeable. The API 
released multiple technical manuals every few years, but they were essentially identical. Though 
they offered more information about improved waste treatment methods, it was up to the 
refineries to implement these methods or to ignore them. The reports also continually refused to 
admit that oil pollution was detrimental to streams. They repeated the same arguments about 
analyzing each stream pollution case separately, because wastes may or may not be harmful 
depending on the characteristics and uses of the waters, and the characteristics of the wastes (API 
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1953; API 1949). This flawed logic was the equivalent of the “If a tree falls in the forest...” 
question. If a refinery pollutes a stream that no one uses, is it really polluted? Thus, refineries 
and chemical companies based their standards on the proximity of the waste stream to public 
water intakes. If noxious tastes and odors caused complaints, plants were more likely to enforce 
standards. However, if no municipalities were downstream to offer complaints, the refineries 
were able to continue their practices (Gorman 2001). This suggests that the API was not 
interested in either environmental quality or economic operations of plants. They were merely 
concerned with preventing federal regulation, and they were in the perfect position to do so. 
They had a monopoly on power and technical knowledge in the arena. Consequently, they could 
define the boundaries of debates on pollution controls and limit the focus of any investigations. 
They did not see themselves, however, as brash polluters, but as proactive in the fight to reduce 
waste. In their view, if a refinery was comfortable with the amount of material they wasted and 
no one in the public complained about the effects, there was no problem. 
The federal government made a feeble attempt to regulate water pollution in 1948 by 
passing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The act called for the federal government to get 
involved in pollution abatement, but only if it involved a watercourse that crossed state 
boundaries. The surgeon general could then attend to the problem if pollution from one state 
endangered public health in another state. However, even if this occurred, the surgeon general 
could only provide modest technical and financial assistance. The act authorized him to “notify 
the polluter and appropriate state agency of the problem and specify a time limit for its 
abatement” (Milazzo 2006: 20). If he got no response, he could send a second notice, and then 
convene a public hearing board to discuss abatement measures. If the polluter still ignored the 
recommendations, the Federal Security Agency could request that the attorney general file suit, 
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but only if the state in which the pollution originated gave consent. However, the state usually 
was not motivated to do so, as it was usually more concerned about the economic impact of 
abatement than about the protests of downstream neighbors (Milazzo 2006). Thus, the act 
attempted to pave the way for federal action in water pollution abatement, but was completely 
ineffective because of its weak enforcement methods. Congress granted the law a three-year 
extension in 1953, but its other actions showed that it did not intend to support enforcement 
efforts. The appropriations committee cut off funds to state pollution control programs, along 
with loans for construction of water treatment plants. By 1955, not a single abatement order had 
been issued under the act’s provisions, and the appropriations committee denied an increase in 
funding for enforcement, stating that the act was almost unenforceable. The only positive effect 
of the law was that it provided funding for research into water pollution issues (Milazzo 2006). 
 Consequently, there was a distinct lack of detailed federal requirements in the waste 
disposal arena between 1940 and 1960, and this left manufacturers accountable for their own 
disposal practices (Colten 2004). State authorities did not object to this situation, however, as 
they vehemently opposed federal regulatory authority (Melosi 2000). The API took control of the 
flow of information and technical knowledge, which allowed them to deflect further criticism 
and attempts at regulation. At the same time, the petroleum industry was growing at a faster rate 
than ever before, and “wartime industrial expansion [had] sacrificed waste treatment to military 
priorities” (Colten 2001: 147). Additionally, the petrochemical industry was developing as a 
viable, separate industry. Many new products had come out of the wartime research of the 
petroleum industry, and demand was increasing for these products. Several major petroleum 
companies moved into petrochemicals, along with the multitude of new startups. This increase in 
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output for the petroleum and petrochemical industries meant an increase in waste and waste 
management problems. 
Public Reactions 
Joseph Pratt attributes most of the environmental problems of the first half of the 
twentieth century to the combination of this massive industrial growth and little planning, 
foresight, or regulation. He defines four “missed opportunities” of the 1920s. First, researchers 
should have monitored the long-term effects of the waste problem. Secondly, policy makers 
should have created stronger, better-funded public institutions that could have dealt with these 
pollution issues. Finally, two changes in attitude would have been required. Oil industry leaders 
should have reassessed their attitudes towards their responsibility in controlling pollution, and 
government leaders should have loosened their reliance on business-dominated cooperative 
efforts. These missed opportunities led to a backlog of problems that were difficult to solve 
because  
“environmental problems neglected during the introduction of an energy source must 
 be adjusted after the society has become organized around this form of energy, often 
 through much disruption and discomfort.” (Pratt 1980: 29)  
 
The petroleum industry had become such an integral part of the infrastructure that it would be 
much too difficult and expensive to change the way it functioned just for the sake of pollution 
abatement. The “missed opportunities” that led to this situation, however, were merely part of a 
larger overall problem: a failure to address waste management problems in a systematic way 
during the early twentieth century. Instead, industry leaders and government officials created ad 
hoc solutions for problems they viewed as temporary. Thus, a lack of dedicated comprehensive 
pollution policy characterized the first half of the twentieth century. This situation existed mostly 
because the people most affected by the pollution did not have access to government officials, 
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whereas the oil industry enjoyed “direct, systematic access” (Pratt 1980: 60). When pollution 
affected the public, they usually responded in the same way. They first registered complaints 
with institutions that had some authority over pollution. Only when the problem was great 
enough to threaten the public image or political power of the oil industry was the problem taken 
seriously. Then, government authorities would create a temporary arena to study the problem, 
usually with cooperation from industry.  
By the 1950s, however, this cooperative system was beginning to show its weaknesses, 
and federal government officials finally had to up the ante. The Corney Creek case was the first 
example of federal intervention into a state’s pollution problem. By 1957, residents and local 
groups in northern Louisiana were still complaining to governmental organizations about their 
pollution issues, specifically the decline of local sportfishing. Brine and oily wastes released 
from Arkansas oil fields had been making their way across the border into Louisiana through 
Corney Creek for years, killing fish and making the water unsafe for cattle and crops. This case 
demonstrated a few characteristics of pollution control in the South that differed from other parts 
of the country. First, local residents viewed the state government as uncooperative. They 
complained to parish officials, who then took the claim to the federal government. In the case of 
Corney Creek, residents had two extra reasons to push for federal intervention. Corney Lake was 
an impoundment of Corney Creek created in 1938 under a federal Soil Conservation Service 
program, and federal authorities still managed it. Secondly, the pollution problem was an 
interstate issue, with both state governments seemingly unable to control the pollution. The other 
Southern characteristic that Corney Creek demonstrated was a focus on pollution’s damaging 
effect on community natural resources, such as fish, wildlife, and agriculture, instead of dangers 
to public health. Although the U.S. Public Health Service would be investigating the matter, 
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Corney Creek residents were concerned primarily about the loss of their fundamental cultural 
activities: hunting and fishing (Colten 2006). Regardless of the focus, Corney Creek was the first 
major example of federal intervention in local pollution matters. Colten (2006), and others, posit 
that Corney Creek was chosen for the first federal interstate pollution intervention because of its 
rural nature. They specifically avoided the Midwest/Northeast industrial corridor at first, because 
they wanted an “easy win” on which to field-test the process. Corney Creek was the first salvo in 
what would soon become a major federal push to reduce pollution. 
Federal intervention, however, did not occur spontaneously. It was the result of a growing 
public outcry over increasing amounts of industrial pollution. When industrial corporations made 
decisions based on economic self-preservation, the public had to deal with the social and 
environmental consequences of those decisions (Douglas 1983). The idea that pollution was the 
“price of progress” was at the base of efficiency ethic, which also asserted that continued 
progress would reduce the initial pollution. By the 1950s, however, the efficiency ethic was 
losing steam. The “price of progress” idea came to a head during World War II, when 
nationalistic and patriotic concerns dominated. Now, the rhetoric asserted, “progress” was 
required to save the world from fascism. During this period industrial growth accelerated without 
the same acceleration in pollution control (Melosi 2000). The public was well aware of the 
growing pollution problem, but were told that it had to wait until after the war, because at no 
time would industry be more necessary than wartime. Trade literature of the day offers multiple 
examples of this attitude, as writers addressed pollution as a post-war problem. Many article 
titles and subtitles include statements such as “…public clamor for clean streams has forced anti-
pollution legislation to a number one spot for postwar action” and “When war production ends, 
  85
stream pollution will receive more attention” (“Industrial Waste…” 1945: 117; Mohlman 1945: 
20).  
However, in the post-war era, America saw a substantial growth in its middle class. The 
baby boom, along with its growing suburbs full of affluent middle-class workers, resulted in a 
population with more free time on their hands. This growth in leisure time meant a growing 
demand for recreation, much of it outdoors. Man’s natural affinity for water led him to the 
nation’s streams, lakes, and oceans, where he could see the damage done by oil pollution. Now 
most of America was witnessing the pollution problem first hand, not just the anglers, hunters, 
naturalists, and conservations leagues (Berry & Horton 1974). Consequently, attention on the 
problem, along with a public outcry for change, increased by orders of magnitude throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. Industry’s monopoly on research, legislation, and regulation was beginning to 
loosen. However, industry did still have a firm hold on its workers, so they were not able to add 
their voices to the ones who were complaining. Unions were still very rare in southern industry, 
thus denying southern workers a chance to organize against growing industrial pollution 
problems. Evidence suggests, however, that even if unions had been common in the South, they 
might have not been involved in environmental issues. Organized labor nationwide was largely 
opposed to environmental regulation, and generally saw themselves as the antithesis of the 
environmental movement. They were afraid that environmental regulations would cost precious 
industrial jobs. In fact, the BASF lockout in Geismar, Louisiana demonstrates the very late 
arrival of union to environmental issues. This 1984 struggle was one of the first major examples 
of unions working with environmentalists in the South (Minchin 2003). 
The long, arduous process of implementing effective water pollution control, and 
wresting power from the hands of the petroleum industry began in the early twentieth century, 
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and has continued to the present. Public attention to the problem increased over the first half of 
the twentieth century, bringing more light to the problem. People recognized that self-regulation 
by industry was failing, and that federal intervention efforts had been far too weak and 
fragmented. They continued to press for better control of petroleum industry wastes, as they had 
for fifty years. Thus, the popular account of a sudden environmental consciousness from the 
public, along with “environmental law springing full blown from the U.S. Congress” after Earth 
Day in 1970, is a vast oversimplification of a complex process nearly one hundred years in the 
making (Davies & Mazurek 1998).  
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Chapter 6 
The Industrial Landscape of Lake Charles 
 
Lake Charles and the War 
 One of the first industrial companies to take advantage of the new amenities offered by 
Lake Charles was the Mathieson Corporation. This company earned the title “the father of Lake 
Charles Industry” for its role in starting the city on its way to becoming one of the major Gulf 
Coast industrial centers. In 1933, the Mathieson Corporation announced that they would build a 
plant in Lake Charles, and by 1936, it had completed the massive Mathieson Alkali Works. At a 
total cost of 7.5 million dollars, the plant was the first industry located on the new deep-water 
channel (Little 1965, Jones 1967). It produced caustic soda, soda ash, salt cake, ammonia, and 
soda bicarbonate. These industrial products are “essential to the glass, soap, rayon, textile, and 
oil industries, and are among the basic chemicals most widely used” (“What the Chemical…” 
1942: 22). The Mathieson plant was also one of the first examples in the country of industrial 
expansion for World War II. In early 1942, Mathieson accepted a Defense Plant Corporation 
contract to begin construction on two new plant expansions at their site in Lake Charles: a 
synthetic ammonia plant and a magnesium plant (“Another Look at…” 1942). The magnesium 
plant used mined deposits of dolomite ore, which were then ground and treated with calcium 
chloride to produce magnesium chloride. Mathieson then used ammonia from its ammonia plant 
to put the magnesium chloride through an electrolysis process, the result of which was 
magnesium and chlorine (“What the Chemical…” 1942). The output for the magnesium plant 
was 36 million pounds annually, much of which other industries used in the manufacture of 
airplanes and bombs (“Another Look at…” 1942). Many of the other substances Mathieson 
produced were also vital to the war effort. Ammonia was important for the manufacture of 
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fertilizers and plastics. Chlorine, although useful as a weapon, was also a water purifier, a 
bleaching agent for textiles and paper, and a raw material used in the manufacture of vinyl 
chloride plastics and synthetic rubbers.  
 The Mathieson Alkali Works was the first heavy industry into the city, but oil refineries 
would prove to be the most prominent new feature in the Lake Charles industrial landscape. The 
Continental Oil Company was the first to build a major oil refinery in the area. Announced in 
1940, the plant commenced operations in 1941, with an initial capacity to process 7,000 barrels 
of crude oil per day. Continental sited the plant, along with Mathieson, across the Calcasieu from 
the city of Lake Charles. In a 1964 study of industrial land uses in Calcasieu Parish, the Arthur 
D. Little firm concluded that many industries located across the river partially because of the 
significantly lower effective tax rate in that area, known as Ward 4 (Little 1964). The 
Continental refinery was a very modern operation, utilizing techniques developed just before the 
outbreak of the war that minimized waste during the refining process. The excess and lower-
quality gases that are the result of many refining processes were, at this plant, “reformed and 
combined to produce motor fuel and … plant fuel,” making this “one of the most efficient ever 
constructed” (Flood 1941: 34). The refinery originally cost $4 million to build, but soon 
expanded to take advantage of the vast local resources. Continental began pumping in additional 
resources from the Ville Platte Oil Field and Tepetate Oil Field north of Lake Charles, 
amounting to about 10,000 barrels a day of crude and 6,000 barrels a day of PBC (propane-
butane-casinghead) stock. The company added another pipeline to take advantage of the oil from 
the Jennings Field south of the city, and by 1950, the plant’s investment had grown to $27 
million. The plant produced motor and aviation fuel, which were essential to the war effort, 
along with diesel and tractor fuel, kerosene, heating oil, and heavy residual fuel oil. 
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The refinery with the biggest impact on the city during this wartime expansion period, 
however, was the Cities Service Refinery. Announced by the Defense Plant Corporation in 1942, 
it began production in early 1944, as one of the very few completely new complexes built for the 
war effort (Jones 1967). One of the biggest industrial complexes ever built, industry and public 
alike hailed it as an engineering and technological marvel. The oil refinery initially only fulfilled 
the need for 100-octane aviation fuel, but the Defense Plant Corporation soon supplemented this 
with attached butadiene, synthetic rubber, anhydrous ammonia, and magnesium plants (along 
with a railroad and electricity generation facility). The DPC funded this agglomeration because 
of the amenities Lake Charles had to offer, but the site was not their first choice. When Cities 
Service administrators and engineers were looking for a plant location, they initially chose St. 
Rose, Louisiana. A Cities Service terminal was already located in this small town just upriver 
from New Orleans. However, other refineries had already claimed all of the supplies of crude 
extracted from and shipped to this area. Cities Service began looking for another site, but they 
had very specific needs. They initially required 600 acres, with more available nearby for 
expansion. They also required a supply of 70,000 barrels of crude oil per day, along with a 
supply of cheap natural gas to power the refinery. For processing and cooling, they would need a 
source of 206,000 gallons of water per minute, equivalent to the needs of a city of 3.25 million 
people. Finally, the refinery would require stable land, a deepwater ship channel, and adequate 
land transportation routes (Land 1994). The officials began looking at the Texas Gulf Coast, but 
the Louisiana administration (headed by Governor Sam Jones from Lake Charles) began a 
campaign to lure them back to Louisiana, specifically, to Lake Charles. The Cities Service 
officials claimed that they would save between $400,000 and $750,000 in taxes by locating in 
Texas rather than Lake Charles. In an extraordinary example of Southern boosterism, Governor 
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Jones countered this by making a personal visit to Cities Service headquarters in New York City. 
With no real authority to do so, he promised Cities Service that the legislature would repeal a 
one-cent-per-barrel refining tax, and that the city of Lake Charles would provide a ten-year full 
tax exemption. This was part of Jones’ agenda of focusing on postwar economic growth even 
before the war ended. He meant to take advantage of wartime industrialization and get as many 
federal dollars as he could for Louisiana. He was also the first governor to break the Long family 
dynasty in Louisiana politics. He believed that the Longs had developed Louisiana in a welfare 
state, and wanted to shift citizens’ dependence from the state to industry by bringing in industrial 
jobs (Cocreham 1971). To do this, Jones planned to attract industry by advertising the state’s 
natural resources and new political climate. Speaking to the state’s Economic Development 
Committee in 1943, he worried about the loss of jobs after the war. He proposed draining and 
cultivating more land, and increasing forest production, oil production, refining, and chemical 
manufacturing. He even spoke of attracting industry to use Louisiana’s sources of clay and peat 
(Jones 1943). In the case of attracting Cities Service, Governor Jones came through on his 
promises. The ten-year exemption passed almost unanimously in a vote by the people of 
Calcasieu Parish, and the legislature repealed the refining tax, albeit after a long fight on the 
floor. The political maneuvering paid off, and Cities Service decided to build the plant in Lake 
Charles. Governor Jones was later happy to take full credit for the industrialization of the city, 
and his friends were willing to give it. One of his advisors later wrote a short, but glowing, 
biography that claimed a direct connection between Jones’ company headquarters visits and the 
industrial growth of the city (Jones 1967; Cocreham 1971). 
The plan for the Cities Service plant initially met some resistance, however, as it was one 
of the few brand new plants built, at a cost of $80 million. People wondered why the government 
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spared no expense to build this facility, when another they could upgrade an existing facility for 
a lower cost. Defenders of the plan argued that the facility was justified due to the “immediate, 
demanding necessity brought about by the war” (Foster 1944: 84). Assistant deputy of the 
Petroleum Administration for War Bruce Brown stated that he approved the project because “it 
gave promise of producing a very large quantity of aviation gasoline with a moderate use of 
construction materials at a very low cost” (“War Plant Yields…” 1943: 24). 
Planners sited the refinery west of Lake Charles at Rose Bluff, a plateau above the 
Calcasieu River. Borings showed the 2,300-acre site to have the stable land needed for 
supporting the heavy refinery equipment. At 18 feet above sea level, it was also safe from 
flooding, unlike most of southwestern Louisiana. The M.W. Kellog firm won the contract to 
build the massive facility, and construction turned out to be a colossal undertaking. The 
contractors hired 11,000 construction workers, who put in 20 million man-hours of work. Quick-
thinking entrepreneurs bought used school buses and created their own bus lines to transport 
workers to the site. Some workers came from as far away as Lafayette (80 miles) and Ville Platte 
(100 miles). Cities Service even built a planned suburban community, Maplewood, to house its 
workers. On a cleared one square mile plot of land, they placed 789 one-, two-, and three-
bedroom homes for workers to rent (Land 1994). By the end of construction, the Cities Service 
Refinery consisted of 114 buildings, 385 general process towers and tanks, 4,095 controls on 
twenty-four control boards, 800 pumps, 2.5 million linear feet of pipe, 6 million linear feet of 
tubes, 140 oil storage tanks capable of storing five million barrels, and three main docks on the 
Calcasieu River Channel (Land 1994; Foster 1944). Planners carefully designed the docks to 
keep waiting times to a minimum during the demanding war period. They constructed two docks 
for tankers and one for barges, with loading capacities of 17,000 barrels per hour of gasoline and 
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unloading capacities of 52,800 barrels per day of crude oil (Foster 1944). They also incorporated 
a tank farm of twenty 80,000-barrel petroleum tanks that already existed on the site into the 
facility. The large size of the facility was necessary because of the massive outputs required by 
the war. The refinery had a processing capacity of 70,000 barrels of crude oil per day, while the 
butadiene plant produced 55,000 short tons of butadiene per year. To increase the efficiency of 
the plant, and increase the output, Cities Service had separate laboratories for the basic refinery 
and the butadiene plant, along with a small pilot plant. New ideas and processes took shape in 
the labs, and then engineers tested them in the pilot plant. In all, the Cities Service facility would 
produce 25 percent aviation-grade (100-octane) gasoline, 21 percent butanes, 13 percent 80-
octane gasoline, 11 percent motor gasoline, 8 percent kerosene, 11 percent furnace oil, and 11 
percent fuel oil (Land 1994). This suggests what a great priority the war effort had over domestic 
fuel needs.  
 The Cities Service Refinery presents an effective example of an economy of scale, where 
enlarging the size of operations lowers production costs. War planners, wanting the most 
efficient output of war fuels and materiel, built the biggest plant they could imagine. The U.S. 
government was impressed with the initial success and efficiency of the operation; they soon 
directed the Defense Plant Corporation to supplement the Cities Service refinery plant with 
butadiene, synthetic rubber, anhydrous ammonia, and magnesium plants (Jones 1967). An 
economy of agglomeration also began to develop in Lake Charles with the concentration of other 
industries. Different levels of industry congregated in places that would expedite the creation of 
finished products, thus further lowering production costs (Figure 3). The Continental Oil and 
Cities Service refineries located in Lake Charles because of the city’s proximity to needed 
resources.  
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Figure 3. Economy of Agglomeration 
(Source: Charles 1958) 
 
When Firestone Tire and Rubber Company moved into Lake Charles, they did so for the same 
reasons, but their primary resources were the oil refineries’ finished products. Cities Service had 
just constructed their massive butadiene plant, providing a convenient source of the materials 
Firestone needed to create synthetic rubber. The Firestone Corporation was literally across the 
street from their needed resources. This lowered transport costs, thus lowering total production 
costs and creating an economy of agglomeration. The Firestone plant opened in 1943, located 
right next to the Cities Service Refinery on the Calcasieu Ship Channel, and was able to produce 
60,000 long tons of synthetic rubber per year (Jones 1967). With this plant, Firestone became the 
first company to manufacture synthetic rubber in a government-owned plant. It was one of 
several the company would build around the country for the war effort (the War Production 
Board set a production quota of 338,000 tons of synthetic rubber for 1943), and this expansion 
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would secure the company an even more advantageous position in the post-war economy 
(“Chemical Industry Playing…” 1942). In fact, all of the companies that operated plants in Lake 
Charles would assume full ownership after the war, so their motivations were most surely not 
only of the patriotic variety. 
All of this wartime expansion had a significant effect on the character of Lake Charles. 
When an Allied supply mission toured the industrial facilities of the area, they were more than 
impressed. They defined industrial expansion in the city as the conversion of a pine forest into 
four “great war plants including the largest aviation gasoline refinery in the world” (Allied 
supply mission… 1944, 12-A). War industries totaling $200 million in investments had been 
located along the Calcasieu River and Ship Channel in Lake Charles, and this permanently 
changed the city’s landscape and character. First, it changed labor availability in the city 
immensely. The Bureau of Labor Statistics stated that the effect of the war on the Lake Charles 
area began with the arrival of troops and personnel to the many Army camps that surrounded the 
area. The real growth, however, began with the construction of the plants. In May 1943, at the 
height of the construction period, more than 13,000 workers were involved in construction 
projects in Lake Charles. Once the plants were finished, numerous manufacturing jobs became 
available. By the end of 1943, 4,900 people worked in manufacturing, and this number generally 
increased, with fluctuations, to 5,100 by fall of 1944. This is more than a doubling of the pre-war 
manufacturing numbers of 2,100 (Department of labor… 1945).  
Arthur D. Little’s 1965 report on prospects for further industrial development in the city 
claims that not only was the available amount of labor a great attraction for industry, but also the 
character of the labor was the best any industry could hope for. The report states that skilled 
workers were plentiful and diverse in their specialties. It also states that labor relations are the 
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best along the Gulf Coast, with Lake Charles having fewer days lost to work stoppage than any 
other city in the region (Little 1965). There was one major work stoppage, but it was unusual in 
that it did not address working conditions or wages. In 1945, Cities Service workers went on 
strike to protest high rents in the Maplewood neighborhood. Although developers created this 
neighborhood for the sole purpose of housing Cities Service employees and their families, the 
Cities Service Corporation stated that they did not own or operate Maplewood and had to no 
connection with the rents charged. The Maplewood Housing Company was actually in charge of 
rents, but the workers felt the most effective way to get their message across was through a strike 
at the refinery. Tensions immediately rose, as it was still wartime and a critical war products 
plant was in danger of shutting down. Louisiana governor Jimmy Davis appealed for federal 
intervention, and President Truman sent a representative from the Petroleum Administration to 
mediate, along with a stern message from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Finally, on 
April 11, 1945, Truman sent 150 Army military police into the Cities Service refinery. Six days 
later, the men of Maplewood voted to return to work, and this incident remained the only major 
work stoppage in the area for years (Ross 1990). 
Post-War Growth  
Growth in one economic sector results in growth in other sectors, according to the model 
of cumulative causation. New manufacturing workers need new housing, schools, shops, 
infrastructure, and services. This is evident in the growth of population and of other services in 
Lake Charles. The city, and the whole parish, developed an accelerated growth rate in the 1930s, 
when industry began to move in. At this time, the parish contained only 1.38 percent of the 
state’s population. Beginning in 1940, however, the parish began to grow at a much higher rate 
than both the state and the entire nation. Construction workers moved in to build the new plants, 
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giving Calcasieu Parish the highest growth rate of all parishes in Louisiana. Most of the workers 
came from the surrounding parishes, many of which soon developed a marked negative growth 
rate. Additionally, most of the incoming labor force was young. Fifty percent of the Lake Charles 
labor force was under thirty-five, compared to a national average of 38 percent (Little 1965). 
Thus, many of these workers were just beginning families, so the birth rate in the parish 
experienced a marked increase (Little 1964). From 1930 to 1940, the population growth rate in 
Calcasieu Parish was 27.9 percent, but by the 1940-1950 decade, it had jumped to 58.6 percent. 
The rate increased even further, to 62.3 percent, during the 1950-1960 decade. By 1960, the 
parish contained 4.47 percent of the state’s population (Little 1964). For a rural portion of a state 
with sixty-four parishes, this is an unusually high number. According to former governor Sam 
Jones in the Centennial History of Lake Charles (1967), in 1940 agricultural income equaled five 
times manufacturing income. By 1950, however, industrialization had reversed these figures. 
This trend continued for the next two decades, and by 1967, manufacturing income was twelve 
times that of agricultural income. In this time, the number of industrial companies in the Lake 
Charles area had increased from three in 1942 to sixteen in 1967. In the same period, individual 
plant units had increased from three to forty-five. To accommodate all of the new workers and 
their families, the city built an astonishing thirty-four new public school buildings between 1940 
and 1950 in the greater Lake Charles area (Jones 1967). This large investment in public 
education paid off, as Arthur D. Little, Inc. reports that by 1965 the average level of schooling 
for the population of the city had increased rapidly. In fact, Lake Charles was catching up to the 
national average level of schooling, while Louisiana as a whole was still lagging far behind 
(Little 1965). 
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Growth of the industrial sector in Lake Charles did not stop or slow down after the war. 
Companies who had been running the plants purchased them from the government and expanded 
them, while new companies were also moving in and purchasing facilities. These expansions 
resulted in a larger amount of finished products, but also more byproducts for which there was 
no market. However, the newly burgeoning petrochemical industry moved in to fill this need. 
The result was more agglomeration and a shift from war production to production of peacetime 
products and petrochemical stock.  The Mathieson Corporation offers a good example of this 
quick expansion. Mathieson Corporation began expanding their Alkali Works facility as soon as 
the war ended. They also bought an anhydrous ammonia plant and converted it to produce the 
makings of fertilizer. By 1947, their soda ash capacity had doubled the 1940 figure. In 1948, the 
company built a sodium nitrate facility to work with the products from the nitric acid plant they 
bought from the Defense Plant Corporation after the war. Just before the company merged with 
Olin in 1954, they built a hydrazine plant. Ten years later came the construction of the world’s 
largest ammonia plant, so that by 1967 the Mathieson facility was ten times as big as it was when 
first built in 1934. Other companies, old and new, also joined the push to expand. Continental 
Oil, now known as Conoco, enlarged its facilities, moving heavily into petrochemicals, so that by 
1967 its capacity was nine times as much as it was in 1941. Firestone purchased its facility from 
the DPC in 1955 for $13 million, and expanded it so that by 1967, it was four times as big as it 
was in 1943. Cities Service and Conoco also joined forces to buy a refinery, which they dubbed 
the Cit-Con Refinery. Columbia Southern Chemical, a new company later known as Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass (PPG), bought a magnesium plant. With no viable peacetime use for magnesium, 
however, they converted the plant for petrochemical manufacture. Other companies took over the 
infrastructure attached to the industrial area. Gulf State Utilities Company bought the power 
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plant that ran the industrial complexes. Kansas City Southern and Southern Pacific railroad 
companies even bought the railways that serviced the plants.  
Two companies that moved in to Lake Charles in the 1950s offer more examples of 
economies of agglomeration. The Lone Star Cement Company built its facility in 1956, using 
local clay and shell to make cement. Mathieson also used local shell as one of its production 
materials, and Lone Star bought the shell that Mathieson considered unusable. Hercules, Inc. 
built a polypropylene plant in 1959 to make plastics. This company made their product from the 
propylene that Columbia Carbon produced across the street. In turn, Columbia Carbon got its 
source materials from the Cities Service Refinery, which was just across another street. These 
two examples show how agglomeration can benefit all levels of industry. In Lake Charles, new 
industrial neighbors offered not competition, but a market for finished goods and waste products. 
Local officials approved of this industrial development as beneficial for Lake Charles and 
Calcasieu Parish. They did all they could to encourage more industrial expansion and 
agglomeration. The Davison Chemical Division of the W.R. Grace Company constructed a 
facility in Lake Charles in 1953, and the story of their arrival demonstrates the eagerness of local 
officials concerning incoming industry. In 1951, representatives arrived in Lake Charles on a 
Wednesday to begin scouting for a suitable plant location. They gave local officials a list of 
requirements. The Port of Lake Charles already provided their first requirement, deep-water 
access. Local authorities took care of their second and third requirements in only one day. The 
company needed an industrial tax exemption, which the city and parish government officials 
immediately offered, and a railroad to the site. One of the local officials made a quick call to a 
friend at the railroad's main corporate office, and had an agreement arranged by Thursday. They 
also quickly helped choose a site for the refinery, suggesting an area called Vincent’s Landing. 
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The last requirement seemed to be the toughest: representatives needed assurance that they 
would have clearance from the Stream Control Commission to use river water for processing and 
waste removal. Local officials worked hard over the weekend, and secured clearance from the 
SCC by Sunday. As a result, it only took local officials from Wednesday to Sunday to meet all of 
the demands of the W.R. Grace Company. By 1953, the company completed construction on 
their plant, which produced sodium silicates and catalysts for petroleum catalytic cracking. The 
plant would soon be the main supplier of catalysts for almost all of the Gulf Coast refineries 
(Jones 1967). 
With economies of scale and agglomeration in full swing, and local officials doing all 
they could to attract new companies, by the mid-1960s Lake Charles had taken on a distinctly 
industrial flavor. The best indications of this come from a series of reports by the firm Arthur D. 
Little, Inc. The firm presented the reports to the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District as 
guides on how to attract even more industry to the city. Two reports presented on April 17, 1964 
were titled “An Economic Base Study of Calcasieu Parish” and “The Role of Industrial 
Promotion in Calcasieu Parish’s Development.” The former gave a basic review of the 
demographics of the area, and the latter reviewed the economic incentives offered by local and 
state governments to industry wishing to locate in the Lake Charles area. The final report, dated 
June 1, 1965 is entitled “Prospects for Industrial Development in Calcasieu Parish,” and reviews 
some of the history of industry in the city along with many of the capability and specification 
factors of the area.  
Most importantly, the Arthur D. Little reports review, and quantify, the massive industrial 
growth of the city, along with showing some major factors that may have influenced this growth. 
The reports begin by stating that, since 1944 when Cities Service built their facility, petroleum 
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refineries have employed more people in the manufacturing sector than any other business in 
Lake Charles. In an effort to explain why so much of the petroleum and petrochemical industry 
chose Lake Charles, the authors then review the promotional efforts of local and state officials. 
They believe that the first major promotion that influenced the continuing industrialization of the 
city was the ten-year tax exemption offered to incoming industry. Police Jury records show how 
they implemented this exemption in Lake Charles. In a May 5, 1942 meeting, the Calcasieu 
Parish Police Jury discussed the new Cities Service project, along with possibilities for other 
Defense Plant Corporation projects. Local business leaders urged the Police Jury to consider a 
ten-year tax exemption. They argued that the tax exemption would be instrumental in the DPC’s 
choosing Lake Charles as the site for more plant projects. They extolled the benefits the new 
plants would bring, such as added payrolls and economic stability. Police Jury members 
complied with their wishes, issuing in the same meeting Ordinance B-471, which called for a 
parish-wide special election on the matter of exempting new industry from all general and 
special taxes. Voting occurred on July 14, 1942, and the proposition passed nearly unanimously, 
with 1,062 voting yes and 13 voting no (Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1942). The second major 
promotion began with the 1952 state constitutional amendment that allowed cities to finance 
industrial development projects. Now Louisiana cities were free to issue bonds to pay for new 
plant facilities, with the only restrictions being that the bonds must be less than twenty percent of 
the total community assessment, and that two state boards (the Bond & Tax Board and the 
Commerce & Industry Board) must review and certify the bonds (State of Louisiana 1955). The 
report states that by 1964, nineteen plants had utilized this provision, receiving a total amount of 
$12,630,000. A third promotion for industrial development was a financing plan available 
through the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District (LCHTD). Like in the plan offered by the 
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constitutional amendment, the LCHTD could issue bonds for property purchase or building 
construction. This plan had a clear advantage over the municipal bonds, however, as no public 
voting was required, and there was no limit to the bond’s size. In addition, for the municipal 
bonds, any local competing industry would have to give their consent for the city to issue the 
bond. For bonds issued by the LCHTD, this was not the case (Little 1964).  
Arthur D. Little, Inc. gives these promotions some of the credit for the massive 
continuing industrialization of the Lake Charles area in the 1950s and 1960s. They begin their 
quantification of this industrial growth by stating that the character of the Gulf Coast at this time 
was one of rapid growth in general. The 1950s were the beginning of a post-war boom for the 
area, with the major portion of the growth between the years 1954 and 1958 (subsequent to the 
1953 amendment). The reports attribute most of this growth to the rise of the petrochemical and 
chemical industries. By 1962, thirty-four of the seventy-five new American petrochemical plants 
were located on the Gulf Coast. Calcasieu Parish and Lake Charles received much of this 
growth. In the ten years after 1955, investment in the petrochemical industry rose 17 percent per 
year in Calcasieu Parish, compared to national average growth of 12 percent per year. Investment 
in the area was not limited to new companies, either. Both Cities Service and Continental Oil 
moved into the petrochemical arena, extracting and selling aromatics from their product stream. 
Cities Service produced orthoxylene and Continental Oil produced benzene, further diversifying 
its operations (Little 1965). All of this new activity continued to increase employment. Jobs in 
the chemical plants and refineries rose 28 percent from 1950 to 1960. From 1956-1962 the 
industries accounted for 32.4 percent of new jobs created in the parish. In the same period, this 
industry took an even more dominant hold over the manufacturing sector in the parish. In 1950 
petroleum and petrochemical jobs accounted for 68.7 percent of manufacturing jobs in the 
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parish, but by 1960, this figure rose to 73.8 percent. These two industries also were extremely 
high-capital industries, bringing in not only jobs, but also large amounts of capital and 
investments. From 1956-1962, they accounted for 71.9 percent of the manufacturing capital 
expenditures (Little 1964).  
Of course, there is another side to all of this industrial development. As Martin Melosi 
wrote, “It stands to reason that two factories in close proximity compound the stress on the 
environment” (Melosi 1980: 8). In Lake Charles, multiple companies were building, then 
expanding, numerous plants, each producing several different types of waste. None of the Arthur 
D. Little reports mentions anything about the environmental impact of this new economic 
development. 
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Chapter 7 
Reactions to Pollution in Lake Charles 
 The true focus of this research is the reaction, from both government and citizen, to the 
increasing water pollution load in Lake Charles during industrialization. Lake Charles had 
developed from an agriculturally based small city to a quickly urbanizing, heavily industrial zone 
in the span of 20 years. Industrialization brought people, jobs, economic prosperity, and trade 
links with the world. Unfortunately, it also brought heavy pollution loads, and transformed the 
river, which had been the heart and lifeblood of the city for many years. People used the river for 
watering cattle, commercial and game fishing, bathing, swimming, and transportation. Pollution 
also affected the river’s use as an industrial water supply, which was its original appeal for many 
of the companies moving to Lake Charles. This chapter will trace the actions of the both 
government and citizen during the rise of industry and water pollution in Lake Charles. It will 
investigate whether wartime priorities were powerful enough to overshadow growing pollution 
threats. It will also examine whether local and state government were more dedicated to 
promoting industrial growth or to protecting citizens and natural resources. Finally, it will look 
into the focus of any pollution abatement movements to find if they focused on public health or 
on natural resource protection.  
Industrialization and the Government 
 When industry began to arrive in the city, companies had to deal with both local 
government and state government. The local governmental body was the Police Jury. In 
Louisiana, police juries are the local governmental authority for areas of the parish that are not 
within city limits. Since virtually all Lake Charles industry was outside of the city limits, 
industrial companies were under the authority of the Calcasieu Parish Police Jury (CPPJ) rather 
than the City of Lake Charles Government. Consequently, the meetings of the CPPJ served as an 
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important intersection between government and industry. The minutes of these meetings reveal 
not only the pace of industrialization in the city, but also local officials' lack of concern over 
growing pollution problems. 
 Analysis of these minutes shows that the Calcasieu Parish government demonstrated 
many of the distinct characteristics of southern local governments dealing with new 
industrialization. First, the members showed an enthusiasm for, and a willingness to cooperate 
with, new industry. This cooperative attitude would become a common characteristic of 
governmental dealings with industry in Lake Charles. The CPPJ is the authority in all land and 
infrastructure matters throughout the unincorporated parish. Thus, any time industry needed to 
build a road, a dock, rail lines, or pipelines, they had to consult this body. Keen to promote 
economic growth, Police Jury members happily approved any request industry made. In fact, 
between 1940 and 1960, the body denied only one request for industrial expansion. By 1944, the 
CPPJ had given the Defense Plant Corporation carte blanche to lay pipeline over, under, or 
alongside any road in the parish without consulting the members. Table 5 demonstrates the 
dominance of industrial infrastructure issues in Police Jury meetings.  
Table 5. 
Issues addressed by the CPPJ related to industrialization, 1940-1960 
 
Infrastructure Pollution Watershed 
Development
Taxes Labor Fishing Federal 
Controls 
 
63 
 
15 
 
6 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
(Source: Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1940-1960) 
 
The CPPJ also looked out for industry economically, holding a special election in 1942 that 
resulted in the ten-year tax exemption for new refineries and chemical plants. Additionally, in 
1949, the CPPJ protested the proposed relaxation of government requirements for using synthetic 
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rubber. The jury members feared that cheaper natural rubber would flood the market, and force 
local butadiene and synthetic rubber manufacturers out of business. They thus went on record 
numerous times in defense of industry (Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1942; Calcasieu Parish 
Police Jury 1949). 
 The state agency that industry dealt with when moving into Lake Charles was the 
Louisiana Stream Control Commission (SCC), as its task was to review all waste disposal 
applications for Louisiana waterways. In practice, though, this state body became a rubber-stamp 
for industrialization, much as the CPPJ was. The SCC was also very bureaucratic, and if there 
was a problem with the wastes a certain company produced, the SCC’s never-ending 
correspondence, resolutions, and meetings would bog down the issue for months or years. For 
example, in 1948 the SCC came to the conclusion that waste from the Cities Service compound 
was polluting the river to an unacceptable degree (SCC Minutes, August 10, 1948). They sent a 
notice to the company, which replied much later with a report refuting the SCC’s claims. The 
report simply stated that, while the SCC’s test had shown no dissolved oxygen in the water, the 
test performed by Cities Service engineers had detected dissolved oxygen. It took a year for the 
issue to come up again. In 1949, an SCC member complained that the Cities Service report still 
had not addressed the accusation that the high temperature of the waste was a problem. Instead 
of flexing their regulatory muscle with a corporation that was apparently giving it the run-
around, the SCC merely decided to continue its correspondence with the company and hope for 
voluntary compliance (SCC Minutes, July 25, 1949). Earlier letters from the SCC to Cities 
Service reveal this unwillingness to directly confront polluting industry: “it is recommended... 
that the objectionable features of…wastes be reduced so as not to remain too close to maximum 
tolerances” (Cusachs 1944). 
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 Part of the problem was the SCC’s basic philosophy on waste disposal. They viewed 
streams and rivers as diluting machines that were the perfect sink for industrial wastes. In fact, 
two of the Commission’s “salient observations on regulations” were that “not all industrial 
effluents are harmful” and that “it is recognized that the stream completes the treatment for many 
industrial wastes” (Fiztner 1962: 2). This may have been true to some degree for a massive 
waterway such as the Mississippi (for which they also rubber-stamped almost all waste permits), 
but the Calcasieu was a nearly tidal stream at Lake Charles. Dilution relies on substantive water 
flow, so applying the SCC’s policies to the Calcasieu was inappropriate. This was not a problem 
for the board, and they continued to approve waste disposal on the Calcasieu. Many times, they 
approved permits without any knowledge of the effect the wastes would have. Companies 
reassured them that prior sampling and studies were unnecessary, since there was no way to 
know the effect of wastes until industrial facilities were online. The board would then approve 
the permit and rely on a later review to determine if there was a problem with the waste (SCC 
Minutes, August 5, 1959). Of course, it would be nearly impossible to convince the company to 
shut the plant down once it was already operating. At the same time it was doing this, it also was 
noting that the Calcasieu was “already loaded to the gills” with industrial waste (SCC Minutes, 
August 5, 1959). Two years later, the SCC rejected an application for a Lake Charles company 
that was making the same argument about prior studies being unnecessary (SCC Minutes, 
November 21, 1961). It seemed the board had finally realized the magnitude of wastes industry 
was releasing into the Calcasieu. However, even with this admission, the SCC stuck to their 
strategy of dilution as the solution. 
 The state government agency that had much more direct contact with industrialization 
and waste pollution in Lake Charles was the Department of Wild Life and Fisheries (DWF). This 
  107
agency (known as the Department of Conservation prior to 1944) held much of the responsibility 
for water pollution monitoring and enforcement. However, during the war years, when industry 
was quickly growing in Lake Charles, the DWF was having manpower problems. The war effort 
drained not only the available pool of expertise but also tightened the department’s budget 
significantly. Biennial reports published during the war are full of frustrated complaints of lack 
of funds and workers. Field forces of all divisions of the DWF were at an absolute minimum, 
making it nearly impossible to find those responsible for pollution problems. Its reports list many 
of the investigations as unfinished. DWF only completed studies through enlisting the help of the 
very industries that it was investigating for pollution. In fact, the agency resigned itself to 
working cooperatively with industry. They believed that “public interest in the problem is merely 
the sum of the special interests” (Louisiana Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1943: 168). 
Since 1940, the DWF dealt with representatives from industry, and in 1941, they began 
bimonthly meetings with technical personnel from petroleum refineries. Even with the 
department’s financial and personnel shortcomings, they showed remarkable foresight into 
pollution problems in Lake Charles. At the beginning of industrialization, DWF had already 
focused investigations on the Calcasieu River because of saltwater intrusion problems. Three 
field workers performed a survey in 1942, demonstrating that the deepening of the ship channel 
had intensified saltwater intrusion from the Gulf. By 1943, however, the field workers had 
“resigned,” possibly due to the war. The DWF was forced continue the study by depending 
“largely on sampling and analysis by the cooperating interests,” that were “representatives of the 
rice, oil, and manufacturing industries” (Louisiana Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1943: 
167). The oil industry was the common culprit in salt-water contamination cases, so their 
contribution is suspect at best. The results of this study (which found that salt-water intrusion 
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was the major culprit, with oil field and industrial wastes only “minor” sources) were made all 
the more suspicious by the fact that the Association of Commerce assembled and tabulated the 
results.  
 By May of 1943, however, DWF found enough funds to place a full-time field 
representative in Lake Charles, partially in response to pleas from the Police Jury. The pleas 
were mostly due to the Police Jury’s fear of losing authority in the parish. CPPJ members felt 
that the State Commisioner of Conservation, who they believed was much too friendly with the 
oil companies, had superseded their authority over the pollution of their waterways (CPPJ 
Minutes April 7 1942). They wanted an expert placed locally to assist with pollution 
investigations; this way they could have a say in local pollution matters. The DWF field man was 
placed “in this now highly industrialized area” primarily to inspect oil fields, refineries, and rice 
irrigation waters. He had an enormous job ahead of him, as he was to inspect all waste disposal 
practices in a six-parish region around Lake Charles. He quickly adopted a cooperative method, 
meeting with refinery technical staff to discuss ways to improve treatment. After a year, the 
language he used in his reports still left much to be desired in terms of convincing the public that 
he had made significant progress in pollution control:  
Problems have been discussed; the establishment of fellowships to determine the 
immediate and cumulative effects of refinery wastes on fishes, has been proposed and 
practically agreed upon. (Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1945: 222) 
 
 Even at this early stage of industrialization, local DWF agents considered the water 
problem severe enough to warrant the attention of state authorities. It recommended a “long-term 
plan based on sound engineering and economic principles” (Louisiana Department of Wild Life 
& Fisheries 1943: 168). That it included economic principles in the plan suggests that it viewed 
industrial expansion as inevitable, and had resigned itself to limiting the damage caused. The 
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DWF also knew how difficult this task would be. It wrote that, first, quickly increasing 
competition for the limited water resources would complicate this long-term plan. Secondly, the 
lack of information about the water supply, present water resource use, and future needs would 
be a serious problem. In fact, the department did not have enough money to make the direct 
observations required to collect this basic information. They relied on federal agencies, such as 
the U.S. District Engineer’s office and the U.S. Weather Bureau for much of its data. It also 
obtained information from the Calcasieu Salt Water Survey, a cooperative made up of the Lake 
Charles Association of Commerce and agricultural, manufacturing, and industrial interests 
(Louisiana Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1943). DWF officials argued for this long-term 
plan because, historically, they had seen exactly the opposite. They wrote that the state 
legislature had a penchant for short-term, unrelated legislation and quick-fix projects. They 
feared that after the war, when construction would stop and the locals would really feel the 
effects of the new industry, the number of these quick-fix projects would explode. If this 
happened, DWF would only have time and money for these types of projects instead of for 
research that could lead to long-term smart environmental planning. DWF finished out the war 
years with continued desperate calls for more funding for studies, enforcement, and field 
workers. They knew that dealing only with industry representatives would not stop pollution. 
They also concluded that continued industrial growth with no pollution control would eventually 
create a water quality situation that would prevent industry from operating (Louisiana 
Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1943).  
 By 1947, the DWF declared that oil pollution could be the most dangerous factor to 
Louisiana biological resources. The same year, Department officials created the Coastal Waste 
Control Section, made up of boats that could check oilfields and refinery outflow sites for oil 
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pollution. The Division of Research and Statistics also received a budget increase, which they 
stated was crucial to study the “multiple effects of industrial waste” that threatened not only fish, 
but also the entire food chain (Louisiana Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1947: 327). All of 
these advances came just in time for a great drought in the summer of 1947. Citizens reported 
fish kills all over the state, even in waterways without significant industrial pollution. Dying 
vegetation clogged the waterways, thus increasing the biological oxygen demand and 
asphyxiating aquatic life. The situation was particularly bad near Lake Charles, due to the 
desperately low flow of the Calcasieu. Once the tide began flowing out, the slug of oxygen-free 
water that had developed near industry waste outfalls moved downstream to Moss Lake, where it 
trapped and asphyxiated most of the fish in the lake. At the end of the 1946-47 biennium, the 
Department of Wild Life and Fisheries continued to express frustration with its mandate. It 
complained of meager funds and understaffed field offices. The writers of the biennial report 
stated that their main task remained cleaning the discharge from industrial plants. They 
conceded, however, that it was very difficult to convince industry to change its established 
practices, especially if the transition would be an expensive one. Consequently, the DWF stayed 
true to its reluctantly cooperative stance in stating that it hoped to be able to promote the 
industrial development of the state and preserve fish and wildlife at the same time (Louisiana 
Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1948). 
 By the 1948-49 biennium, The Department of Wild Life and Fisheries agents were 
slightly more optimistic. In terms of water pollution regulation enforcement, they had shifted 
into an investigative role. They let the Stream Control Commission handle the enforcement and 
litigation, as the SCC’s legal powers were, in their view, more efficient and effective. No fish 
kills occurred on the Calcasieu for the summer of 1949, although this was more attributable to 
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favorable weather conditions than progress in pollution control. However, the DWF agents had 
pinpointed the culprit of the Moss Lake fish kills. They believed that the Cities Service refinery 
was the most culpable for these events, and placed additional blame on Cities Service for 
contamination of rice irrigation water in the area. Technical personnel at the refinery investigated 
the problem along with members of DWF and the SCC. They determined that the release of 
small amounts of waste with a very high biological oxygen demand, rather than a continuous, 
low-BOD release caused the contamination. Refinery technicians promised that they were 
addressing the problem. The DWF report also stated that there were indications that industry 
executives were beginning to realize the public-relations implications of their waste disposal 
methods (Louisiana Department of Wild Life & Fisheries 1950). The hopeful tone of this 
suggests that DWF, still feeling restricted by toothless legislation and meager funding, had to 
continue relying on cooperative methods and simply hope for voluntary industry compliance. 
 In 1950-51, DWF investigations had focused almost exclusively on southwest Louisiana. 
This area had two large refineries, multiple heavy chemical plants, three pine products plants, 
and a large number of oilfields. The two refineries alone accounted for half of the state’s total 
refining capacity. Because of this industrial concentration, DWF agents undertook a complete 
biological and chemical investigation of the Calcasieu drainage system. They were slowly 
gaining a better understanding of the processes at work in this river system, and believed that the 
oilfield and refinery operators were becoming more responsible. Increased use of impoundments 
for a more consistent, slow release of high-BOD waste led DWF to conclude that pollution 
abatement efforts in the area were progressing satisfactorily (Louisiana Department of Wild Life 
& Fisheries 1952). 
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Industrialization and the Citizen  
 The reactions of citizens to industrialization in the parish were somewhat similar to the 
reactions of DWF. Locals showed concern over the effect on industrial wastes from the moment 
the first wartime plants arrived, as their familiarity with oil field brine and its effects on 
agricultural irrigation made them skeptical observers. These citizens turned to their local and 
state leaders for assistance, but the results were generally disappointing. Citizens began as early 
as 1942, demonstrating that wartime production priorities were not as much a concern to them as 
the protection of local water resources. In April of that year, the presidents of two local farming 
and cattle associations wrote letters inquiring about the release of chlorides from the Mathieson 
Alkali Works. They received reassurances that the company was impounding these wastes 
during the rice-growing season (Glenn 1942). By 1944, the famous Seaman A. Knapp, the very 
man who had helped bring the rice industry to southwestern Louisiana, was involved in pollution 
discussions. He sent multiple letters to SCC members concerning industrial wastes in the Lake 
Charles area (Knapp 1944a; Knapp 1944b). He became involved that year in a pollution issue 
involving Mathieson Alkali Works. The company was discharging so much calcium carbonate 
sludge that the wastes had settled and form a bar in the middle of the Calcasieu, which could 
possibly have proven hazardous to navigation (Knapp 1994c). Three months after the problem 
developed, Mathieson closed the waste outfall and claimed they were designing a better system 
(Hudson 1944). Later that year, property owners along Bayou d’Inde sent a petition to the SCC 
about the condition of the bayou. They complained that wastes from nearby butadiene and 
synthetic rubber plants rendered the bayou void of aquatic life for a three to four mile stretch 
(SCC Minutes, September 14, 1944). The SCC sent an inquiry to Cities Service, who was the 
major source of wastes in the bayou at that time. The company reassured the board that they had 
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employed a full time professional to study and control the plant’s waste disposal system. These 
incidents, along with a 1945 discussion of the combined trade waste in the Calcasieu, makes 
evident that the members of the SCC were well aware of what industry was dumping into the 
river and the effect it had (SCC Minutes, September 24, 1945). Nonetheless, for (at least) the 
next fifteen years, they approved ever-growing discharges of waste into the river.  
 CPPJ meetings also served as a sounding board for citizen complaints. The topic of 
pollution from the new refineries, however, never emerged until two years after the end of WWII 
(Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1947). In March 1947, War Department engineers called a public 
hearing in the nearby town of Jennings. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss proposals for 
stream improvements and address the more established problems of salt-water intrusion and 
flooding, but stream pollution was also on the agenda. Ironically, many residents who planned to 
attend were not able due to road flooding (Mermentau hearing… 1947). A committee made up of 
CPPJ members did make it to the meeting, and what they heard inspired them to focus on 
refinery water pollution for the next few months. At the next meeting, members passed a 
resolution stating they would petition the SCC, the Corps of Engineers, and the Louisiana Stream 
Conservation Commission to enforce existing laws to stop the pollution of the Calcasieu. In a 
July meeting, the Police Jury strengthened the resolution with testimony from citizens. Nine 
residents attended the meeting and spoke about the condition of the Calcasieu River. Almost all 
of the witnesses were fishermen, and attested to their new inability to find healthy fish: 
 
In the week of May 17, Fred McCloy gave me fish which he said he caught in local 
waters. Said fish had such an oil taste it could not be eaten. Frequently I make boat trips 
down the Calcasieu River to Cameron and nearly always see oil slicks on the river. I 
frequently see oil coming out of Bayou d’Inde [a tributary of the Calcasieu River], 
sometimes ½” thick. (Graves Castle, Lake Charles resident) 
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Bayou d’Inde formerly contained many game fish; now there are none there. There is 
always oil on the water of the Bayou d’Inde unless the tide takes it out. At Old Town Bay 
there is always a showing of oil which comes from the Gillis Oil Field. There is a vast 
amount of timber which has been killed by substances put in the water at Old Town Bay 
in the Moss Bluff area, and adjoining the Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., property. 
Formerly there were many fish in Old Town Bay, now very few. (Frank Kelly, Lake 
Charles resident)  
      (Calcasieu Parish Police Jury Minutes 1947) 
 
Most of the citizens knew the exact waste discharge points for the large refineries, such as Cities 
Service and Mathieson Alkali Works, and reported many dead fish near these outfalls. There was 
a severe drought during that summer, so stream flow was very low and refineries used up all of 
the dissolved oxygen. The Police Jury used this evidence to go on record as opposing the 
“indiscriminate killing of aquatic life” (Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1947). Members sent copies 
of the new resolution to the SCC, Louisiana Conservation Commission, and Corps of Engineers.  
 Throughout the 1950s, citizens continued to complain about the quality of local waters. 
Bayou d’Inde and Bayou Choupique, two small tributaries of the Calcasieu, were the subject of 
many complaints. Landowners near Bayou Choupique complained that overflow of tainted water 
from the bayou was ruining their crops and pastureland. Bayou d’Inde ran through an oil field 
and the middle of a large industrial agglomeration, and both contributed to its pollution. 
Residents consistently reported oil slicks and foam on the surface of the water, along with fish 
kills and dead timber on the banks. The Calcasieu received the wastes carried in these two 
bayous, along with wastes expelled directly to the river from refineries such as Cities Service. 
Anglers continually complained about the quality of the river water. In 1954, they requested that 
the police jury outlaw commercial fishing in the Calcasieu, Moss Lake, Prien Lake, and Lake 
Charles, and declare the areas sportfishing-only zones. They cited the decrease in fish stocks 
over the previous ten years as the reason for this petition. Fishing was not the only recreational 
activity affected by industrial pollution; in 1956, the Police Jury had “No Swimming Allowed” 
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signs posted on the riverbank in an area park. Throughout this period, residents from downstream 
Cameron Parish were also weighing in with their complaints. They requested an investigation by 
a state legislative committee in 1948, which the legislature granted. Witnesses appeared before 
the committee in a July meeting and testified that pollution from upriver was ruining the oyster 
and shrimp harvests (Norton 1948). By 1960, the problem was no better, and residents 
complained to the CPPJ that pollution was still ruining their shrimp and oyster harvests in 
Calcasieu Lake. Jury members responded by promising to petition the state legislature for funds 
to study the problem (Calcasieu Parish Police Jury 1960). However, even with all of these 
complaints, the focus of the CPPJ was on promoting industrial growth. If a pollution issue arose, 
CPPJ members discussed it for one or two meetings, and then dropped it. The most the CPPJ 
ever did was to write a letter or adopt a resolution with no real consequences. The data from 
Table 5 illustrates the lack of focus on pollution issues compared to industrial infrastructure. 
 While the Police Jury, the DWF, and the SCC offered places for citizens to voice their 
concerns about water pollution, the Parish Court offered relief that was more direct. Citizens 
could file a nuisance suit against offending polluters, and hope to receive an injunction or 
monetary compensation. Surprisingly, in Calcasieu Parish this was not a common practice for 
water pollution problems. Between 1935 and 1964, only two water pollution nuisance suits came 
before the Calcasieu Parish Court. In 1950, six citizens sued Mathieson Alkali Works because of 
a broken pipeline. The pipeline, which carried brine that seeped into the surrounding ground, 
ruined the local water well supply. Some citizens fell ill, one ruined his car by washing it with 
the salty water, and the water destroyed a number of water heaters and clothes washers. The 
neighborhood had to dig a new well, and looked to the parish court for compensation. The judge 
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in the case ordered Mathieson to pay for the replacement of the well (Cole v. Mathieson Alkali 
Works 1950).  
 The other nuisance suit occurred six years earlier, and dealt not with industrial waste but 
with resource extraction. In mid-1944, Mathieson Alkali Works submitted an application to the 
Corps of Engineers for dredging in Lake Charles, Prien Lake, and Indian Bay. Seventy-five 
thousand cubic yards of clamshells rested at the bottom of the water bodies, and Mathieson 
wanted them. Their processing required only three raw materials, and shell (from which they 
produced lime) was the most important. The Alkali Works was one of only seven in the country 
to produce alkalis from ammonia-soda. The Mathieson executives claimed that competition was 
high and profit margins low, so they needed to keep production costs down. Extracting shell 
locally was one way to do this. Once William Gorham and twelve other residents of the 
shorelines of these water bodies found out about the plan, however, they sued in parish court to 
stop the dredging. They stated in their suit that the clams kept the water clean, and were a 
valuable natural resource. With dredging operation muddying the waters, and without the clams 
to clean it, the plaintiffs claimed that the water would be unsuitable for swimming, bathing, 
boating, and fishing. They reminded the court that these were all important local activities and 
that servicemen from the armed forces bases nearby enjoyed these waters, invoking a twinge of 
patriotic guilt. Citizens also brought the suit to the attention of the Parish Police Jury, who joined 
the suit as a plaintiff. Soon afterward, the commissioner of DWF joined the suit as a defendant. 
The DWF (back when it was the Department of Conservation) had given Mathieson the right to 
all Calcasieu Parish clam beds, and the commissioner offered to defend that contract. The 
Bogue-Chitto Pearl River Soil Conservation District also joined the suit as a defendant. They had 
just built a $35,000 shell-crushing plant in Slidell, Louisiana, and claimed that if the plaintiffs 
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won, they too would lose their primary source of clam and oyster shells. Despite all of the 
support for the defendant, the court ultimately found against Mathieson. The judge ruled that 
their contract with the Department of Conservation was unconstitutional, and issued a permanent 
injunction against the dredging (Gorham v. Mathieson Alkali Works 1944). 
 The other nuisance suits brought against refineries and other Lake Charles industry did 
not involve water pollution. Citizens brought two suits against the Continental refinery for 
damage to nearby homes cased by the ignition of excess chemicals. The plaintiffs suddenly 
dropped both these after Continental denied any wrongdoing (Lejeune v. Continental Oil Co. 
1964; Scott v. Continental Oil Co. 1964). Other residents brought two suits against the same 
refinery for damage to homes caused by windborne carbon black deposits. Local residents 
complained that carbon black settled on their homes, yards, and cars. They claimed that it ruined 
car paint, clothesline laundry, walls, floors, and posed a health hazard. The first suit saw the 
judge deliver a compromise settlement, reducing the amount awarded from $38,510 per home to 
$20,000 per home. He also ruled that the plaintiffs could not sue again for one year (Daigle v. 
Continental Oil Co. 1959). 
 Thus, in Calcasieu Parish, citizens rarely brought suits against industry. Only twice was 
this method successful. In the other cases, the plaintiffs suddenly dropped the suit without 
explanation, or the judge reduced the award and refused to offer an injunction. This suggests the 
power a large industrial corporation held over common citizens. These multimillion-dollar 
companies most likely had an stable of high-priced lawyers at their disposal, while citizens had 
to band together into groups of twelve or fifteen to even bring a case to court. One telling 
example of this power is that the Cities Service Corporation retained the services of a law firm 
headed by Sam Jones, the former governor of Louisiana who was so instrumental in bringing 
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industry to Lake Charles. One can only imagine the sort of political connections this man had, 
and to face him and a large national corporation in court must have seemed a foolish venture. 
Summary 
 This research has found that, first, wartime priorities were not enough to take the focus 
away from growing pollution threats. Locals had been dealing with the threat of brine pollution 
for years, so they did not think twice of complaining when the large refineries and chemical 
works moved in and began discharging wastes. Secondly, both the local and state governments 
gave lip service to protecting citizens from industrial waste, but in reality, their focus was on 
promoting industrial growth. The Stream Control Commission discussed waste issues with 
industry, but did not push very hard for reform, and almost never fully used their powers. The 
Department of Wild Life and Fisheries was extremely concerned about industrial wastes in the 
area, but shortages of money and labor forced them into a cooperative relationship with industry. 
The Calcasieu Parish Police Jury gave citizens an arena for complaints, but their record shows 
that they were much more concerned with industrial expansion. Finally, the focus of any anti-
pollution sentiment was on preservation of natural resources instead of public health issues. The 
establishment of the Department of Wild Life and Fisheries as the main pollution investigation 
and enforcement agency shows a particularly southern focus on protection of natural resources. 
In addition, any time pollution issues surfaced at CPPJ or SCC meetings, or in any 
correspondence, the only consequences discussed involved natural resources. People complained 
of fish kills, sick cattle, ruined crops, and bad oyster and shrimp harvests. The nuisance suit 
concerning the fouled well was the only time public health became an issue. Even though the 
municipal water supply did not come from the river, people used the water for bathing, 
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swimming, boating, and other forms of recreation, as well as a supply of fish and other edible 
aquatic creatures. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 Several factors coincided with, and facilitated, the growth of the petroleum industry in 
the first half of the twentieth century. First, economic and technological changes resulted in 
dramatic expansion of the industry. Demand shifted from kerosene to gasoline, and increased 
exponentially thanks to the burgeoning automobile industry. Second, these transportation 
developments also changed the face of industrial location decisions. Improved infrastructure 
allowed oil companies to locate further from markets, and closer to raw material sources. Third, 
the petroleum industry received a colossal boost from federal wartime investment. The 
government required production of many special materials, and was willing to fund the 
construction of specialized facilities to produce them. This also included an investment in 
research that, along with information sharing in the name of patriotism, advanced the technology 
of petroleum refining and petrochemicals far faster than peacetime. This growing industry 
required more land for expansion, and higher costs in the Northeast and Midwest caused them to 
look elsewhere. Fourth, Southern local and state governments were busy with boosterism, 
offering multiple incentives to industry. The governments touted the gulf coast as the preferable 
location for the petroleum and petrochemical industry. Natural resources were abundant and 
inexpensive. The rural nature of the South meant that land was plentiful, unoccupied, and cheap. 
Agricultural mechanization left a large, non-union workforce looking for employment. All of 
these factors contributed to the decentralization of American industry and the exponential growth 
of the petroleum and petrochemical industries in the South.  
 Lake Charles offers a ideal example of the expansion of these industries to the South. 
Before industrialization, it was a typical Southern small city with a small population and an 
agriculturally based economy. When industrialization occurred in Lake Charles, it coincided 
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with, and was a part of, the rapid expansion and decentralization of the petroleum industry. The 
Lake Charles case is also typical of the South in that the state, parish, and city administrations 
made heavy use of incentives to lure industry to the area. They argued that Lake Charles was the 
ideal location for industrial investment. The area had abundant land, especially on the western 
side of the Calcasieu River, which had a higher elevation and was less prone to flooding. The 
city also had a labor surplus because of the mechanization of local agriculture operations. The 
major attraction, however, was the cheap natural resources, and access to water transportation. 
Local and state government also offered multiple tax breaks and subsidies to incoming Lake 
Charles industry, which was a common practice in Southern states. However, the greatest 
catalyst for industrial growth in the city was World War II federal investment. The most obvious 
example of this is the Cities Service Refinery, which the federal government built for the 
production of war supplies. In general, federal investment attracted high-tech, high-wage 
industrial operations to the city, and hastened the formation of infrastructure and an industrial 
economy. These subsidized improvements would serve to encourage further industrial growth, 
which became a common pattern across the South. 
Industrial growth in the Lake Charles area quickly transformed a rural, agricultural 
landscape into an urban, industrial one. This expansion also brought water pollution, a 
devastating addition for an area so dependent on natural resources and the environment. Previous 
research, however, argued that the South accepted pollution for economic progress. This 
argument had even more strength in Louisiana, a place with a reputation for corrupt government. 
This research attempts to show that though people generally accepted this argument, the truth 
behind it is not so simple. First, the “pollution for progress” idea may hold true for the local and 
state governments involved, but not for individual Louisianans. As soon as refineries moved into 
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the area, citizens noticed the unpleasant effects on local water bodies. While wartime priorities 
were reason enough for industry to put off pollution control measures, patriotism was not 
sufficient to silence local citizens. They began complaining to the Stream Control Commission in 
1942, even before the construction (in Lake Charles) of the largest aviation gasoline refinery in 
the world. Parish officials were somewhat sympathetic to citizen complaints, but they continued 
to promote industrial growth at the expense of water quality. In addition, the state charged two of 
its agencies with protecting the citizens and natural resources of the state, but they failed 
miserably. The Stream Control Commission focused on facilitating economic growth rather than 
protection of water quality, even though it received regular reports of fish kills and other 
problems. The Department of Wild Life and Fisheries exhibited commendable forethought and 
concern about the ad hoc, lackluster manner in which the state administration and legislature 
were addressing environmental issues. However, a lack of funding would force it into a 
cooperative strategy that resulted in dubious industry-led investigations and little to no 
enforcement of water pollution regulations. Unfortunately, local citizens did not generally file 
nuisance suits, although this could have proven the most efficient way to stop offensive polluters. 
Finally, the reactions of Lake Charles citizens to the new pollution revolved around private 
property and community resource protection rather than public health. Thus, Colten’s (2006) 
claim that Southern environmental issues focused on natural resources applies to not only rural 
Southern areas but also urbanizing industrial zones. In summary, this research demonstrates a 
fundamental conflict between development-minded government institutions and a population 
interested in protecting natural resources. The responses of citizens to pollution in this 
industrializing Southern city expose an underlying popular dissatisfaction with pollution-tolerant 
policy. 
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